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Search Results (427857 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-119993 1 Microsoft 5 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 2 more 2026-11-17 6.5 Medium
Access of resource using incompatible type ('type confusion') in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
CVE-2026-111309 1 Microsoft 5 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 2 more 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Release of invalid pointer or reference in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
CVE-2026-110068 1 Microsoft 11 365 Apps, Microsoft 365, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021 and 8 more 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Use after free in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
CVE-2026-110043 1 Microsoft 5 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 2 more 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
CVE-2026-126905 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Incomplete cleanup in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126908 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to potentially execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126909 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 9.6 Critical
Use after free in Passwords in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126910 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126911 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 8.8 High
Use after free in Accessibility in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Critical)
CVE-2026-126912 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 9.6 Critical
Buffer overflow in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126913 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 3.4 Low
Out of bounds read in Compositing in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to read memory outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-126914 1 Google 1 Chrome 2026-11-17 4.3 Medium
Uninitialized resource in Skia in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.78 allowed a remote attacker to obtain cross-origin data via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
CVE-2026-98100 1 The Document Foundation 1 Libreoffice 2026-11-17 N/A
LibreOffice can import documents in the HWP format, including pictures that link to an external file. An out-of-bounds read existed when the link target of a crafted picture was read, so memory past the picture data could end up in the converted document. In fixed versions the link target is taken only from the picture data.
CVE-2026-97999 1 The Document Foundation 1 Libreoffice 2026-11-17 N/A
LibreOffice Base documents can hold an embedded HSQLDB database. When the experimental features option is enabled, LibreOffice offers to migrate such a database to the embedded Firebird engine when the document is opened. A heap buffer overflow existed when binary values were copied during the migration, because a value could be longer than the space set aside for its column. In fixed versions that space is enlarged whenever a value is longer than its column.
CVE-2026-97894 1 The Document Foundation 1 Libreoffice 2026-11-17 N/A
LibreOffice Calc can open spreadsheets in the DIF format, and text files such as CSV in the UTF-16 encoding. Both are read one line at a time. An out-of-bounds read existed when a line of a crafted file was read, because the length of the line could be miscalculated, so memory beyond the line could be copied into the imported document. In fixed versions each line is read up to its limit and no further.
CVE-2026-93673 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-17 4.8 Medium
The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.
CVE-2026-93672 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-17 5.3 Medium
bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer. The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first. The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert. The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.
CVE-2026-93670 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-17 3.5 Low
The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build. With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound. The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands. Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.
CVE-2026-93669 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-17 4.7 Medium
The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80). If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself. The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows. The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.
CVE-2026-93668 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-17 6.5 Medium
The Bluetooth Classic SDP server in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c allocated every response PDU through bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which expands to bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and therefore uses a K_FOREVER timeout. The allocation is made from sdp_pool, a fixed pool holding only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one in the default configuration) that is shared with the SDP client role. When the pool is empty the call blocks without a bound. The allocation is reached from bt_sdp_recv() on the Bluetooth host's RX context: the bt_workq "BT RX WQ" workqueue in the default configuration since v3.1.0, and the dedicated "BT RX" thread before that. This context processes all normal-priority HCI events and all received ACL data. The SDP L2CAP server is registered on PSM 0x0001 with no security requirement (BT_SECURITY_L0), so an unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range of a connectable device can drive it. Every malformed or unrecognised SDP PDU reaches send_err_rsp(), and the sdp_svc_search_req(), sdp_svc_att_req() and sdp_svc_search_att_req() handlers allocate as well, so a short burst of pipelined requests drains the pool and parks the RX context in the blocking allocation. A pool buffer is released only once its response has been sent, and a peer that withholds baseband acknowledgements keeps the controller's buffers for the link full, so the response is never sent. While the RX context is blocked, the entire Bluetooth host, for all connections and both LE and BR/EDR, stops processing normal-priority HCI events and received data. In most affected releases the stall is permanent. Queued PDUs are freed only by connection or channel teardown, which waits for the normal-priority Disconnection Complete handler, and that handler runs on the blocked RX context, so the host does not recover without a reset. In v3.7.0 through v4.1.x the TX processor discards the queued response once the link supervision timeout drops the connection, so each stall ends at that timeout, but the peer can reconnect and repeat it for as long as it stays in range. The impact is limited to availability; no memory corruption or information disclosure is involved. The fix adds sdp_svc_create_pdu() using K_NO_WAIT, pre-allocates the response buffer once in bt_sdp_recv(), stashes the request in sdp->recv_pending when no buffer is available, and retries it from a work handler once a buffer is freed by the pool destroy callback.