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Search Results (12063 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-119838 | 1 Microsoft | 23 Windows 10 1607, Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2 and 20 more | 2026-11-14 | 4.7 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Installer allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119846 | 1 Microsoft | 20 Windows 10 1809, Windows 10 21h2, Windows 10 21h2 and 17 more | 2026-11-14 | 7.8 High |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Subsystem for Linux allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. | ||||
| CVE-2026-119999 | 1 Microsoft | 10 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 7 more | 2026-11-14 | 6.5 Medium |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. | ||||
| CVE-2026-116308 | 1 Postgresql | 1 Postgresql | 2026-11-14 | 4.3 Medium |
| Buffer over-read in PostgreSQL dict_int allows a database user to disclose portions of server memory, via a zero-length token. Versions before PostgreSQL 18.7, 17.12, 16.16, 15.20, and 14.25 are affected. | ||||
| CVE-2026-125405 | 1 Ettercap-project | 1 Ettercap | 2026-11-14 | 8.1 High |
| Ettercap through 0.8.4.1 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in Parse_NTLM_Auth() in src/dissectors/ec_http.c due to unvalidated NTLM message offsets. Attackers can send a crafted HTTP Authorization header observed by Ettercap to read beyond the buffer, disclosing memory or crashing the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-125261 | 1 Ffmpeg | 1 Ffmpeg | 2026-11-14 | 6.1 Medium |
| FFmpeg through 9.0.2 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the SGI encoder's encode_frame() in libavcodec/sgienc.c, where unsigned size variables mis-handle negative linesize frames. Attackers can supply a video whose display matrix triggers autorotate vflip, so transcoding to SGI images reads pixel data far outside the frame and crashes the process. | ||||
| CVE-2026-124996 | 1 Turboderp-org | 1 Exllamav3 | 2026-11-14 | 6.3 Medium |
| A weakness has been identified in Turboderp-org ExLlamaV3 up to 1.6.3. The impacted element is the function routing_sel_norm_kernel of the file exllamav3/exllamav3_ext/routing.cu of the component hash-MoE routing. This manipulation of the argument gate.tid2eid causes out-of-bounds read. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. Upgrading to version 1.6.4 is sufficient to resolve this issue. Patch name: c9a57ae832a3035e264e0a412e1daf4ebb699b98. Upgrading the affected component is recommended. | ||||
| CVE-2026-125193 | 1 Ffmpeg | 1 Ffmpeg | 2026-11-14 | 6.1 Medium |
| FFmpeg through 9.0.2 contains an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bitpacked_decode_uyvy422() in libavcodec/bitpacked_dec.c because it never verifies packets hold width * height * 2 bytes. Attackers can supply truncated bitpacked UYVY422 packets via crafted SDP/RFC 4175 RTP sessions or raw input to crash applications or expose adjacent heap memory. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90832 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-14 | 4.3 Medium |
| bt_hci_le_per_adv_report_common() in subsys/bluetooth/host/scan.c handles the HCI_LE_Periodic_Advertising_Report (and _v2) event. It verified that the fixed event header was present and that the controller-declared Data_Length fits the tailroom of the periodic-sync reassembly buffer, but never checked that the event actually carried as many data bytes as evt->length claims. Both reassembly paths — DATA_STATUS_PARTIAL, and DATA_STATUS_COMPLETE while a chain is already in progress — then called net_buf_simple_add_mem(&per_adv_sync->reassembly, buf->data, evt->length), copying up to 255 bytes starting past the end of the event's real payload. The Data_Length field originates in the HCI controller, so the flaw is reachable in host-only/split builds where the controller is a separate part reached over H4 UART, SPI, USB or an inter-core IPC transport: a malicious, compromised or buggy controller (or an attacker able to inject on that link) can send a report declaring a length larger than the event payload. The generic event dispatcher in subsys/bluetooth/host/hci_core.c only enforces a per-event minimum length and never cross-checks the subevent's internal length field, so nothing else catches it. Builds using Zephyr's own in-image controller are not affected, because the controller always emits a length matching the bytes it appends. Exploitation additionally requires CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC with CONFIG_BT_PER_ADV_SYNC_BUF_SIZE > 0 (the option defaults to 0, which compiles the reassembly block out; LE Audio broadcast-sink and Public Broadcast Profile applications that reassemble fragmented periodic advertising data set it), and an established periodic advertising sync. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read of adjacent HCI RX-pool memory — including stale contents of previously received HCI events — which is copied into the reassembly buffer and then delivered to every registered bt_le_per_adv_sync_cb.recv listener as if it were received advertising data, so the disclosed memory becomes application-visible and may be forwarded off-device. The write side remains in bounds because the tailroom check uses the same length value, so there is no memory corruption; impact is limited to information disclosure and undefined behaviour on the over-read. The fix drops any report whose declared length exceeds the remaining event payload, matching the guard already present in the extended and legacy advertising report handlers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-77685 | 1 Zephyrproject | 1 Zephyr | 2026-11-14 | 8.3 High |
| The RFCOMM multiplexer control-channel handler in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/rfcomm.c computed the echo length for a BT_RFCOMM_TEST command as buf->len - 1 and passed it to rfcomm_send_test(), whose length parameter is a uint8_t. A malformed but FCS-valid UIH frame on DLCI 0 can leave buf->len == 0 after rfcomm_handle_msg() pulls the two-byte MCC header, so buf->len - 1 underflows and narrows to 255. rfcomm_send_test() then copies 255 bytes out of a receive buffer that holds no remaining valid data, and appends them to an outgoing L2CAP PDU allocated with only CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU (253 by default for CONFIG_BT_CLASSIC) bytes of tailroom. The source read runs past the end of the ACL receive buffer into adjacent buffers of the same net_buf pool, and the destination copy overruns the transmit buffer by about eight bytes; net_buf_add_mem() performs no runtime bounds check in ordinary builds, where the underlying __ASSERT_NO_MSG() is compiled out. The trigger is a single five-byte RFCOMM frame on the multiplexer control channel, which is processed as soon as the L2CAP channel for PSM 3 is established — before any DLC exists and independent of RFCOMM session state. bt_rfcomm_init() registers that L2CAP server with .sec_level = BT_SECURITY_L1, which l2cap_br_conn_security() accepts without any link key from a peer that does not claim host Secure Simple Pairing support, so an unpaired BR/EDR device in radio range of a connectable target with CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM enabled (SPP, HFP, HSP, GOEP and similar profiles all enable it) can reach the defect. The resulting 255-byte TEST response is transmitted back to the attacker, disclosing roughly 255 bytes of adjacent stack/pool memory — including the contents of neighbouring receive buffers, which an attacker can prime with earlier packets — and the accompanying out-of-bounds write corrupts memory following the transmit buffer, which can crash the Bluetooth host. The request is trivially repeatable, so both the disclosure and the corruption can be driven at will. Two fixes are needed, and the first on its own does not close the out-of-bounds write. Fix 1 (0040ef781e1d, #115768) strips the FCS byte in rfcomm_recv() and echoes buf->len, rejecting anything over UINT8_MAX, which removes the underflow and the over-read. But rfcomm_make_uih_msg() still allocates the response with bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and never compares the requested length with the buffer's tailroom, so a well-formed TEST command carrying a pattern of about 248 bytes or more still builds a response (3-byte frame header, 2-byte message header, pattern, FCS) larger than the 253 bytes available. A pattern that long can only be received when the RFCOMM L2CAP receive MTU (CONFIG_BT_RFCOMM_L2CAP_MTU, which defaults to CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE) exceeds CONFIG_BT_L2CAP_TX_MTU. The plain BR/EDR defaults (200 against 253) cannot reach it, but from v4.3.0 enabling CONFIG_BT_GOEP raises CONFIG_BT_BUF_ACL_RX_SIZE to 264 (265 from v4.4.0), so GOEP builds with only fix 1 applied still overrun the transmit buffer by up to eight bytes. This includes v4.3.2, the last v4.3 release, which carries fix 1 but will not receive fix 2. Fix 2 (214530895dd3, #118293) checks the tailroom on every RFCOMM PDU allocation and closes this residual write. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64667 | 1 Mcdope | 1 Pam Usb | 2026-11-13 | 4.4 Medium |
| pam_usb provides hardware authentication for Linux using removable media. Prior to version 0.9.3, src/local.c (pusb_get_tty_from_display_server) allocates a 4096-byte cmdline buffer, reads up to 4096 bytes from /proc//cmdline, then replaces every NUL separator with a space. When read(2) returns exactly 4096 bytes for any process the function inspects, the buffer ends without a terminator and the subsequent strstr() calls scan past the allocation boundary. The function is invoked during normal PAM authentication when DISPLAY is set, so the read fires for every process at auth time. Consequences are bounded: strstr output is a Boolean substring match (limited info-disclosure surface) but a hostile heap layout can produce a SIGSEGV that terminates the host PAM process. This issue has been patched in version 0.9.3. | ||||
| CVE-2026-59628 | 1 Google | 1 Android | 2026-11-13 | 4 Medium |
| In s_copy_host_apb_param of multiple files, there is a possible way to trigger an out of bounds read in the video decoder command queue due to a logic error. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62975 | 1 Bacnetstack | 1 Bacnet Stack | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the RAMFS-backed FILE implementation accepts AtomicWriteFile(record-access) requests that replace existing records with caller-controlled content. If a client replaces a record with shorter data, the backend can shrink the heap allocation and then continue processing with a trailing-copy length derived from the old layout. During that replace path, the RAMFS backend computes the trailing-copy length from the old file layout, then shrinks the heap allocation, and finally uses the stale length in memmove(). As a result, the source range of that memmove() can extend beyond the end of the reallocated heap buffer, producing a heap out-of-bounds read. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-129217 | 1 Frrouting | 1 Frrouting | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| In FRRouting (FRR) 8.3 through 10.5.1, bgp_notify_decapsulate_hard_reset() in bgpd/bgp_packet.c does not validate the length of the data field of a received BGP NOTIFICATION Cease/Hard Reset message (RFC 8538). When the data field is exactly one byte long, the function reads one byte past the end of a heap buffer and the 16-bit length of the encapsulated data underflows to 65535, causing a 65535-byte out-of-bounds heap read followed by an assertion failure. A remote BGP peer that has established a session and negotiated the Graceful Restart capability with the Notification (N) bit can send such a message to crash the bgpd daemon, terminating all BGP sessions (denial of service). This is fixed in 10.0.5, 10.1.5, 10.2.6, 10.3.4, 10.4.3, 10.5.2 and 10.6.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-58265 | 1 Bacnetstack | 1 Bacnet Stack | 2026-11-13 | 6.5 Medium |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a BACnet/SC peer can trigger a heap out-of-bounds read (up to 3 bytes), pre-authentication, in the BACnet/SC header-option decoder. bvlc_sc_decode_proprietary_option() reads the vendor-id and option-type at fixed offsets [3],[4],[5] before checking the option's declared header length, and the option-list validator never enforces a minimum length for proprietary options. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-62972 | 1 Bacnetstack | 1 Bacnet Stack | 2026-11-13 | N/A |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, lighting_command_decode in src/bacnet/lighting.c decodes its first field with the bounded apdu_size - apdu_len, but every nested decode in the operation switch is called with the original full apdu_size while the read pointer has been advanced to &apdu[apdu_len]. The leaf decoders bound their reads against the size they are told, so they read up to apdu_len bytes past the end of the caller's buffer, resulting in an out-of-bounds read. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28249 | 2026-11-13 | N/A | ||
| Improper preservation of consistency between independent representations of shared state in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to potentially affect cache coherency for guest context pages resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-28247 | 2026-11-13 | N/A | ||
| Improper Access Control Applied to Mirrored or Aliased Memory Regions in AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) firmware could allow a malicious hypervisor to change the encryption bit for guest context pages potentially resulting in loss of integrity. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46674 | 1 Bacnetstack | 1 Bacnet Stack | 2026-11-13 | 7.5 High |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability exists in bacnet-stack's AtomicWriteFile record-access path. The bug is caused by a mismatch between an externally controlled returnedRecordCount field and the fixed-size internal fileData[] array used by BACNET_ATOMIC_WRITE_FILE_DATA. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46677 | 1 Bacnetstack | 1 Bacnet Stack | 2026-11-13 | 6.5 Medium |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1, there is a client-side out-of-bounds read in the AtomicReadFile-ACK record-access handling path. The issue is caused by a mismatch between a remote returnedRecordCount value and the fixed local fileData[] array capacity in BACNET_ATOMIC_READ_FILE_DATA. The ACK decode path preserves the remote RecordCount, discards storage for excess records without truncating that count, and a downstream sink later iterates over the original RecordCount and indexes fileData[i] out of bounds. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1. | ||||