Export limit exceeded: 426385 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.

Search

Search Results (426385 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-126152 1 Fortinet 1 Fortimail 2026-11-16 7.6 High
A authorization bypass through user-controlled key vulnerability in Fortinet FortiMail 8.0.0 through 8.0.1, FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.6, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.8, FortiMail 7.2 all versions may allow an authenticated remote attacker to delete arbitrary directories as root, or to access or delete other users' calendar and mailbox data across tenant domains, via crafted HTTP requests to the webmail and administrative interfaces.
CVE-2026-65951 2026-11-16 5.8 Medium
A path traversal vulnerability in the TAR.GZ extraction logic of Lenovo XClarity Essentials OneCLI 5.5.0 for Linux could allow an attacker to write arbitrary files with the privileges of the OneCLI process by convincing a user to process a specially crafted TAR.GZ update package.
CVE-2026-126161 1 Fortinet 1 Fortimail 2026-11-16 7.5 High
A uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability in Fortinet FortiMail 8.0.0 through 8.0.1, FortiMail 7.6.0 through 7.6.6, FortiMail 7.4.0 through 7.4.8 may allow a remote unauthenticated attacker to cause a denial of service via repeated unauthenticated POST requests.
CVE-2026-67250 2026-11-16 7.3 High
A local privilege escalation (LPE) vulnerability in Pebble’s installers could allow a local attacker with low privilege access to place a malicious Dynamic Link Library (DLL) where a privileged executable file will load it.
CVE-2026-93666 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 5.3 Medium
The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role. An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state. With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.
CVE-2026-93667 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 5.9 Medium
The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled). The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check. The resulting call passes a struct net_if where the driver expects a struct device and a struct net_pkt where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive. The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.
CVE-2026-93668 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 6.5 Medium
The Bluetooth Classic SDP server in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c allocated every response PDU through bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which expands to bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and therefore uses a K_FOREVER timeout. The allocation is made from sdp_pool, a fixed pool holding only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one in the default configuration) that is shared with the SDP client role. When the pool is empty the call blocks without a bound. The allocation is reached from bt_sdp_recv() on the Bluetooth host's RX context: the bt_workq "BT RX WQ" workqueue in the default configuration since v3.1.0, and the dedicated "BT RX" thread before that. This context processes all normal-priority HCI events and all received ACL data. The SDP L2CAP server is registered on PSM 0x0001 with no security requirement (BT_SECURITY_L0), so an unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range of a connectable device can drive it. Every malformed or unrecognised SDP PDU reaches send_err_rsp(), and the sdp_svc_search_req(), sdp_svc_att_req() and sdp_svc_search_att_req() handlers allocate as well, so a short burst of pipelined requests drains the pool and parks the RX context in the blocking allocation. A pool buffer is released only once its response has been sent, and a peer that withholds baseband acknowledgements keeps the controller's buffers for the link full, so the response is never sent. While the RX context is blocked, the entire Bluetooth host, for all connections and both LE and BR/EDR, stops processing normal-priority HCI events and received data. In most affected releases the stall is permanent. Queued PDUs are freed only by connection or channel teardown, which waits for the normal-priority Disconnection Complete handler, and that handler runs on the blocked RX context, so the host does not recover without a reset. In v3.7.0 through v4.1.x the TX processor discards the queued response once the link supervision timeout drops the connection, so each stall ends at that timeout, but the peer can reconnect and repeat it for as long as it stays in range. The impact is limited to availability; no memory corruption or information disclosure is involved. The fix adds sdp_svc_create_pdu() using K_NO_WAIT, pre-allocates the response buffer once in bt_sdp_recv(), stashes the request in sdp->recv_pending when no buffer is available, and retries it from a work handler once a buffer is freed by the pool destroy callback.
CVE-2026-93672 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 5.3 Medium
bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer. The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first. The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert. The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.
CVE-2026-125453 2 Thimpress, Wordpress-extensions 2 Learnpress, Learnpress 2026-11-16 5.3 Medium
Improper Neutralization of Script-Related HTML Tags in a Web Page (Basic XSS) vulnerability in ThimPress LearnPress learnpress allows Code Injection.This issue affects LearnPress: from n/a through 4.4.13.
CVE-2026-126526 1 Microsoft 10 365 Apps, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2021, Microsoft Office Ltsc 2024 and 7 more 2026-11-16 8.8 High
Heap-based buffer overflow in Microsoft Office OneNote allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network.
CVE-2026-102892 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 5.3 Medium
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260416.0, public TAXII 2.1 collections configured with taxii_public set to true are served under the high-privilege SYSTEM_USER context rather than a restricted public-sharing user context. Unauthenticated requests can therefore bypass object markings, organization segregation, and authorized_members restrictions and retrieve restricted threat-intelligence objects that match the collection filters; a broad or absent filter can expose most of the database. Version 7.260416.0 remediates this issue for new configurations, but public-sharing configurations created before that version are not covered and are tracked separately in GHSA-25r9-q6rp-j7jw.
CVE-2026-104840 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 N/A
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260428.0, the token GraphQL mutation used for primary login has no endpoint-specific rate limit, while the global Express limiter defaults to permitting 10,000 requests in a one-second window. An unauthenticated remote attacker can make password guesses at network speed against a chosen user account and, if a credential is recovered, access the account's threat-intelligence data and permitted operations. This issue is fixed in version 7.260428.0.
CVE-2026-121708 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 8.1 High
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260513.0, Draft Workspace identifiers are accepted without verifying that the authenticated user can access the referenced draft. Any authenticated user can enumerate draftWorkspaces, use a disclosed DRAFT_ID with draftWorkspaceEntities to read unpublished reports, descriptions, observables, and other staged intelligence, or place the identifier in the opencti-draft-id header and run mutations that inject entities and relationships into another user's private workspace. The flaw permits cross-user disclosure and tampering but does not cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 7.260513.0.
CVE-2026-76822 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 4.3 Medium
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260701.0, the caseIncidentAdd, caseRfiAdd, and caseRftAdd GraphQL mutations require only authentication and do not require a capability check. An authenticated user with reader-level permissions can therefore create incident, request-for-information, and request-for-takedown case objects regardless of the user's assigned role, causing unauthorized changes to platform data. This issue is fixed in version 7.260701.0.
CVE-2026-63477 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 8.8 High
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260624.0, an Organization Administrator with VIRTUAL_ORGANIZATION_ADMIN and KNOWLEDGE_KNUPDATE can use organizationFieldPatch to replace the administered organization's grantable_groups without a SETTINGS_SETACCESSES authorization check. The administrator can add the built-in Administrators group to that grant scope and then bypass the grantable_groups guard added by the incomplete CVE-2026-44730 remediation to add their own account to Administrators. Membership grants the BYPASS capability after session cache refresh, escalating the tenant-scoped account to global administrator with access across organizations, users, settings, markings, connectors, and ingestion. This issue is fixed in version 7.260624.0.
CVE-2026-104253 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 5.2 Medium
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260715.0, a ProfileQuery response can expose the user's TOTP MFA secret after activation. A person who can access the profile response can recover the secret, enroll a duplicate authenticator, and generate valid one-time codes, undermining the account's second-factor protection. This issue is fixed in version 7.260715.0.
CVE-2026-104258 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 5.5 Medium
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. In 7.260722.0 and earlier, a user with the SETTINGS_SETCUSTOMIZATION capability can configure a webhook notifier with an arbitrary destination URL and invoke notifierTest to make the OpenCTI server send the request immediately. The request can target internal services or cloud metadata endpoints that are reachable from the server, enabling server-side request forgery without waiting for a notifier event. No fixed release is verified by the available evidence; later releases remain unclassified.
CVE-2026-114505 1 Opencti-platform 1 Opencti 2026-11-16 N/A
OpenCTI is an open source platform for managing cyber threat intelligence knowledge and observables. Prior to 7.260722.0, the GraphQL endpoint accepts query operations over HTTP GET because CSRF prevention is disabled (csrfPrevention: false), placing the complete GraphQL query and its arguments in the request URL. Server and reverse-proxy logs, browser history, and shared caches can retain sensitive filters, marking-restricted identifiers, and investigation search arguments, allowing a person with access to those records to recover legitimate users' query contents. GraphQL mutations are not accepted over GET, and the issue does not permit code execution. This issue is fixed in version 7.260722.0.
CVE-2026-93669 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 4.7 Medium
The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80). If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself. The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows. The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.
CVE-2026-93670 1 Zephyrproject 1 Zephyr 2026-11-16 3.5 Low
The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build. With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound. The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands. Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.