| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/gfx9: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit b71604f8685b0eba07866f4e8dc30f93e1931054) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Bump asid_generation on CPU online to avoid ASID collision after hotplug
If a vCPU stays scheduled out (or blocked) while the last pCPU it ran
on goes through a hotplug cycle (online->offline->online), and the vCPU
then resumes execution on the same pCPU, then it is possible for it to
run with an ASID that has now been assigned to a different vCPU,
resulting in stale TLB translations being used.
svm_enable_virtualization_cpu() resets asid_generation to 1 and sets
next_asid to max_asid + 1 on every CPU online event, including hotplug
cycles. Because next_asid starts beyond the pool boundary, the first
call to new_asid() after an online event always wraps the pool,
incrementing asid_generation to 2 and assigning ASIDs starting from
min_asid.
Consider two vCPUs from different VMs, vCPU-A pinned to CPU-X holding
asid_generation=2 and ASID=N from before the hotplug event:
1. CPU-X goes offline and back online: asid_generation resets to 1,
next_asid = max_asid + 1.
2. One or more vCPUs migrate to CPU-X and call new_asid(), wrapping
the pool and consuming ASIDs starting from min_asid. Eventually
vCPU-B from a different VM is assigned asid_generation=2, ASID=N
— the same ASID that vCPU-A held before the hotplug.
3. vCPU-A enters pre_svm_run() on CPU-X: current_vmcb->cpu is
unchanged so the migration branch is skipped. Its saved
asid_generation=2 matches sd->asid_generation=2, so the generation
check silently passes and vCPU-A continues running with ASID=N —
the same ASID just freshly assigned to vCPU-B.
Both vCPUs from different VMs now run on CPU-X with the same ASID,
causing them to share NPT TLB entries and producing stale translations.
The collision manifests as a KVM internal error (Suberror: 1, emulation
failure). The NPT page fault reports a faulting GPA far outside the
VM's physical memory range — a sign of stale TLB translations being
used. KVM falls back to instruction emulation, which fails on
FPU/XSave instructions (XRSTOR, STMXCSR) that the emulator does not
implement.
Fix this by incrementing asid_generation instead of resetting it to 1
in svm_enable_virtualization_cpu(). On module load, asid_generation
starts at 0 (memset) and the increment produces 1, identical to the
old behaviour. On subsequent hotplug cycles the generation advances
beyond any value a vCPU previously observed on this CPU, so the
generation check in pre_svm_run() reliably forces new_asid() on every
vCPU after every hotplug cycle. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_digest_pe_contents
pefile_digest_pe_contents() computes the trailing-data hash length as
pelen - (hashed_bytes + certs_size). A crafted PE can make the addition
exceed pelen, causing the unsigned subtraction to underflow to ~4 GiB.
This is passed to crypto_shash_update() which reads out of bounds and
panics on unmapped vmalloc guard pages.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900038d8000
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:sha256_blocks_generic (lib/crypto/sha256.c:152)
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__sha256_update (lib/crypto/sha256.c:208)
crypto_sha256_update (crypto/sha256.c:142)
verify_pefile_signature (crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c:436)
kexec_kernel_verify_pe_sig (kernel/kexec_file.c:151)
__do_sys_kexec_file_load (kernel/kexec_file.c:406)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
</TASK>
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Validate that the addition does not overflow and the result does not
exceed pelen before the subtraction. Return -ELIBBAD on failure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler
The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first
configuration when none is selected:
if (cdev->config)
config = cdev->config;
else
config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs,
struct usb_configuration, list);
if (!config)
goto done;
...
memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value);
list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns
container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead.
When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct
usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that
offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response
buffer.
cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on
gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver
that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds
cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch.
Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix hard lockup on disconnect
If submitting the OOB write urb fails persistently (e.g if the device is
being disconnected) the driver would loop indefinitely with interrupts
disabled.
Check for urb submission errors when sending OOB commands to avoid
hanging if, for example, open(), set_termios() or close() races with a
physical disconnect.
This is issue was flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated change
to the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommufd: Set upper bounds on cache invalidation entry_num and entry_len
iommufd_hwpt_invalidate() takes a user-controlled entry_num and entry_len,
each bounded only by U32_MAX. An entry_len beyond the kernel's struct size
makes the copy helper verify the extra bytes are zero, scanning that excess
in one uninterruptible pass; a multi-gigabyte value over zeroed user memory
trips the soft-lockup watchdog.
A large entry_num is the other half, driving the backend invalidation loop
with no reschedule. The VT-d nested handler, for one, copies each entry and
flushes caches per iteration, pinning the CPU on a non-preemptible kernel.
Cap both in the ioctl. entry_len is held under PAGE_SIZE, above any request
struct, and entry_num under 1 << 19, the order of a hardware invalidation
queue and well beyond any real batch, bounding the per-call loop length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: tegra: fix pm_runtime leak on mutex_lock failure
If tegra_i2c_mutex_lock() fails, the function returns without calling
pm_runtime_put(), leaking the runtime PM reference acquired by the
preceding pm_runtime_get_sync(). This prevents the device from ever
entering runtime suspend.
Add the missing pm_runtime_put() before returning on lock failure. |
| ZAC is an open-source, workflow-based Common Ground component for Dutch municipal case management. Prior to 5.2.0, by-id read endpoints in `src/main/kotlin/nl/info/zac/app/zaak/ZaakRestService.kt` omit `assertPolicy`(`policyService.readZaakRechten(zaak).lezen`) authorization. `RequestAuthorizationFilter` and `hasAnyApplicationRole` require only an application role on any zaaktype, not the target case's type, while `zaak-rechten.rego` enforces the actual `zaaktype_allowed` boundary only when invoked. An authenticated low-privileged municipal user who knows a case or decision UUID can use `GET /rest/zaken/besluit/zaakUuid/{uuid}` (`listBesluitenForZaakUUID`) to read decisions including types, dates, and free-text toelichting; `GET /rest/zaken/besluit/{uuid}/historie` (`listBesluitHistorie`) to read audit old/new values; and `GET /rest/zaken/{uuid}/process-diagram` (`downloadProcessDiagram`) to read BPMN workflow state across unauthorized zaaktypes. The advisory also identifies `zaak/{uuid}/afzender` (`listAfzendersVoorZaak`) as exposing zaaktype mailbox configuration without a policy check. The search/_zoek path is correctly authorization-filtered and is not part of this by-id read cluster. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.0. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
signal: clear JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for caller in zap_other_threads()
When a multi-threaded process receives a stop signal (e.g., SIGSTOP),
do_signal_stop() sets JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING and JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME on all
threads and sets signal->group_stop_count to the number of threads. If
one of the threads concurrently calls execve(), de_thread() invokes
zap_other_threads() to kill all other threads. zap_other_threads()
aborts the pending group stop by resetting signal->group_stop_count to 0
and clears the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for all other threads. However, it
fails to clear the job control flags for the calling thread.
When execve() completes, the calling thread returns to user mode and
checks for pending signals. Seeing the stale JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING flag,
it calls do_signal_stop(), which invokes task_participate_group_stop().
Since JOBCTL_STOP_CONSUME is still set, it attempts to decrement the
already-zero signal->group_stop_count, triggering a warning:
sig->group_stop_count == 0
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 6475 at kernel/signal.c:373
task_participate_group_stop+0x215/0x2d0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_signal_stop+0x3be/0x5c0 kernel/signal.c:2619
get_signal+0xa8c/0x1330 kernel/signal.c:2884
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0xbc/0x840 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8c/0x4d0 kernel/entry/common.c:98
do_syscall_64+0x33e/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
Fix this race condition by clearing the JOBCTL_PENDING_MASK for the
calling thread in zap_other_threads(), ensuring it does not retain any
stale job control state after the thread group is destroyed. This aligns
with other functions that tear down a thread group and abort group
stops, such as zap_process() and complete_signal(), which correctly
clear these flags for all threads including the current one. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: sg: Resolve soft lockup issue when opening /dev/sgX
The parameter def_reserved_size defines the default buffer size reserved
for each Sg_fd and should be restricted to a range between 0 and 1,048,576
(see https://tldp.org/HOWTO/SCSI-Generic-HOWTO/proc.html). Although the
function sg_proc_write_dressz enforces this limit, it is possible to bypass
it by directly modifying the module parameter as shown below, which then
causes a soft lockup:
echo -1 > /sys/module/sg/parameters/def_reserved_size
exec 4<> /dev/sg0
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#5 stuck for 26 seconds! [bash:537]
Modules loaded:
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 537 Command: bash, kernel version 6.19.0-rc3+ #134,
PREEMPT disabled
Hardware: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS version
1.16.1-2.fc37 dated 04/01/2014
...
Call Trace:
sg_build_reserve+0x5c/0xa0
sg_add_sfp+0x168/0x270
sg_open+0x16e/0x340
chrdev_open+0xbe/0x230
do_dentry_open+0x175/0x480
vfs_open+0x34/0xf0
do_open+0x265/0x3d0
path_openat+0x110/0x290
do_filp_open+0xc3/0x170
do_sys_openat2+0x71/0xe0
__x64_sys_openat+0x6d/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x62/0x310
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The fix is to use module_param_cb to validate and reject invalid values
assigned to def_reserved_size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix AMDGPU_INFO_READ_MMR_REG
There were multiple issues in that code.
First of all the order between the reset semaphore and the mm_lock was
wrong (e.g. copy_to_user) was called while holding the lock.
Then we allocated memory while holding the reset semaphore which is also
a pretty big bug and can deadlock.
Then we used down_read_trylock() instead of waiting for the reset to
finish.
(cherry picked from commit 361b6e6b303d4b691f6c5974d3eaab67ca6dd90e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
audit: fix incorrect inheritable capability in CAPSET records
__audit_log_capset() records the effective capability set into the
inheritable field due to a copy-paste error. Every CAPSET audit
record therefore reports cap_pi (process inheritable) with the value
of cap_effective instead of cap_inheritable.
This silently corrupts audit data used for compliance and forensic
analysis: an attacker who modifies inheritable capabilities to
prepare for a privilege-escalating exec would have the change masked
in the audit trail.
The bug has been present since the original introduction of CAPSET
audit records in 2008. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Wrap DCN32 phantom-plane allocation in DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED
[Why]
dcn32_validate_bandwidth() wraps dcn32_internal_validate_bw() with
DC_FP_START()/DC_FP_END(). In x86 non-RT, DC_FP_START takes fpregs_lock(),
which disables local softirqs.
The DML1 path through dcn32_enable_phantom_plane() calls kvzalloc() to
allocate ~335 KiB for dc_plane_state. This triggers the vmalloc path,
which calls BUG_ON(in_interrupt()) because it's invoked within the
FPU-enabled (softirq disabled) region, leading to a kernel crash.
[How]
Wrap the dc_state_create_phantom_plane() call with the
DC_RUN_WITH_PREEMPTION_ENABLED() macro to allow preemption during
this memory allocation.
(cherry picked from commit 885ccbef7b94a8b38f69c4211c679021aa27ad11) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/memory-failure: fix hugetlb_lock AA deadlock in get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
Two concurrent madvise(MADV_HWPOISON) calls on the same hugetlb page can
trigger a recursive spinlock self-deadlock (AA deadlock) on hugetlb_lock
when racing with a concurrent unmap:
thread#0 thread#1
-------- --------
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON)
-> poisons the folio successfully
madvise(folio, MADV_HWPOISON) unmap(folio)
try_memory_failure_hugetlb
get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
spin_lock_irq(&hugetlb_lock) <- held
__get_huge_page_for_hwpoison
hugetlb_update_hwpoison()
-> MF_HUGETLB_FOLIO_PRE_POISONED
goto out:
folio_put()
refcount: 1 -> 0
free_huge_folio()
spin_lock_irqsave(&hugetlb_lock)
-> AA DEADLOCK!
The out: path in __get_huge_page_for_hwpoison() calls folio_put() to drop
the GUP reference while the hugetlb_lock is still held by the hugetlb.c
wrapper get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). If concurrent unmap has released
the page table mapping reference, folio_put() drops the folio refcount to
zero, triggering free_huge_folio() which attempts to re-acquire the
non-recursive hugetlb_lock.
Fix this by moving hugetlb_lock acquisition from the hugetlb.c wrapper
into get_huge_page_for_hwpoison(). Place spin_unlock_irq() before the
folio_put() at the out: label so the folio is always released outside the
lock.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix race, rename label per Miaohe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md: fix array_state=clear sysfs deadlock
When "clear" is written to array_state, md_attr_store() breaks sysfs
active protection so the array can delete itself from its own sysfs
store method.
However, md_attr_store() currently drops the mddev reference before
calling sysfs_unbreak_active_protection(). Once do_md_stop(..., 0)
has made the mddev eligible for delayed deletion, the temporary
kobject reference taken by sysfs_break_active_protection() can become
the last kobject reference protecting the md kobject.
That allows sysfs_unbreak_active_protection() to drop the last
kobject reference from the current sysfs writer context. kobject
teardown then recurses into kernfs removal while the current sysfs
node is still being unwound, and lockdep reports recursive locking on
kn->active with kernfs_drain() in the call chain.
Reproducer on an existing level:
1. Create an md0 linear array and activate it:
mknod /dev/md0 b 9 0
echo none > /sys/block/md0/md/metadata_version
echo linear > /sys/block/md0/md/level
echo 1 > /sys/block/md0/md/raid_disks
echo "$(cat /sys/class/block/sdb/dev)" > /sys/block/md0/md/new_dev
echo "$(($(cat /sys/class/block/sdb/size) / 2))" > \
/sys/block/md0/md/dev-sdb/size
echo 0 > /sys/block/md0/md/dev-sdb/slot
echo active > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
2. Wait briefly for the array to settle, then clear it:
sleep 2
echo clear > /sys/block/md0/md/array_state
The warning looks like:
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
bash/588 is trying to acquire lock:
(kn->active#65) at __kernfs_remove+0x157/0x1d0
but task is already holding lock:
(kn->active#65) at sysfs_unbreak_active_protection+0x1f/0x40
...
Call Trace:
kernfs_drain
__kernfs_remove
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns
sysfs_remove_group
sysfs_remove_groups
__kobject_del
kobject_put
md_attr_store
kernfs_fop_write_iter
vfs_write
ksys_write
Restore active protection before mddev_put() so the extra sysfs
kobject reference is dropped while the mddev is still held alive. The
actual md kobject deletion is then deferred until after the sysfs
write path has fully returned. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/amd/ibs: Avoid calling perf_allow_kernel() from the IBS NMI handler
Calling perf_allow_kernel() from the NMI context is unsafe and could be
fatal. Capture the permission at event-initialization time by storing it
in event->hw.flags, and have the NMI handler rely on that cached flag
instead of making the call directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: fix potential deadlock in mt7925_roc_abort_sync
roc_abort_sync() can deadlock with roc_work(). roc_work() holds
dev->mt76.mutex, while cancel_work_sync() waits for roc_work()
to finish. If the caller already owns the same mutex, both
sides block and no progress is possible.
This deadlock can occur during station removal when
mt76_sta_state() -> mt76_sta_remove() ->
mt7925_mac_sta_remove_link() -> mt7925_mac_link_sta_remove() ->
mt7925_roc_abort_sync() invokes cancel_work_sync() while
roc_work() is still running and holding dev->mt76.mutex.
This avoids the mutex deadlock and preserves exactly-once
work ownership. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7921: fix potential deadlock in mt7921_roc_abort_sync
roc_abort_sync() can deadlock with roc_work(). roc_work() holds
dev->mt76.mutex, while cancel_work_sync() waits for roc_work()
to finish. If the caller already owns the same mutex, both
sides block and no progress is possible.
This deadlock can occur during station removal when
mt76_sta_state() -> mt76_sta_remove() -> mt7921_mac_sta_remove() ->
mt7921_roc_abort_sync() invokes cancel_work_sync() while
roc_work() is still running and holding dev->mt76.mutex.
This avoids the mutex deadlock and preserves exactly-once
work ownership. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: fix deadlock in remain-on-channel
mt76_remain_on_channel() and mt76_roc_complete() call mt76_set_channel()
while already holding dev->mutex. Since mt76_set_channel() also acquires
dev->mutex, this results in a deadlock.
Use __mt76_set_channel() instead of mt76_set_channel().
Add cancel_delayed_work_sync() for mac_work before acquiring the mutex
in mt76_remain_on_channel() to prevent a secondary deadlock with the
mac_work workqueue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: usbhid: fix deadlock in hid_post_reset()
You can build a USB device that includes a HID component
and a storage or UAS component. The components can be reset
only together. That means that hid_pre_reset() and hid_post_reset()
are in the block IO error handling. Hence no memory allocation
used in them may do block IO because the IO can deadlock
on the mutex held while resetting a device and calling the
interface drivers.
Use GFP_NOIO for all allocations in them. |