| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Avoid clearing VMCB_LBR in vmcb12
svm_copy_lbrs() always marks VMCB_LBR dirty in the destination VMCB.
However, nested_svm_vmexit() uses it to copy LBRs to vmcb12, and
clearing clean bits in vmcb12 is not architecturally defined.
Move vmcb_mark_dirty() to callers and drop it for vmcb12.
This also facilitates incoming refactoring that does not pass the entire
VMCB to svm_copy_lbrs(). |
| A flaw was found in Netty. A remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit a vulnerability in Netty's HTTP/1 to HTTP/2 conversion process. When an HTTP/1 request includes both an absolute-form request-target and a conflicting Host header, Netty incorrectly prioritizes the Host header for the HTTP/2 :authority field, discarding the original request-target authority. This inconsistency can allow an attacker to bypass security controls in Netty-based proxies or gateways, potentially leading to unauthorized access, cache poisoning, or misrouting of requests. |
| In dialInternal in multiple locations, there is a possible permission bypass due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In getCallingPackageName of Shared.java, there is a possible way to bypass activity start restrictions due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86-64: rename misleadingly named '__copy_user_nocache()' function
This function was a masterclass in bad naming, for various historical
reasons.
It claimed to be a non-cached user copy. It is literally _neither_ of
those things. It's a specialty memory copy routine that uses
non-temporal stores for the destination (but not the source), and that
does exception handling for both source and destination accesses.
Also note that while it works for unaligned targets, any unaligned parts
(whether at beginning or end) will not use non-temporal stores, since
only words and quadwords can be non-temporal on x86.
The exception handling means that it _can_ be used for user space
accesses, but not on its own - it needs all the normal "start user space
access" logic around it.
But typically the user space access would be the source, not the
non-temporal destination. That was the original intention of this,
where the destination was some fragile persistent memory target that
needed non-temporal stores in order to catch machine check exceptions
synchronously and deal with them gracefully.
Thus that non-descriptive name: one use case was to copy from user space
into a non-cached kernel buffer. However, the existing users are a mix
of that intended use-case, and a couple of random drivers that just did
this as a performance tweak.
Some of those random drivers then actively misused the user copying
version (with STAC/CLAC and all) to do kernel copies without ever even
caring about the exception handling, _just_ for the non-temporal
destination.
Rename it as a first small step to actually make it halfway sane, and
change the prototype to be more normal: it doesn't take a user pointer
unless the caller has done the proper conversion, and the argument size
is the full size_t (it still won't actually copy more than 4GB in one
go, but there's also no reason to silently truncate the size argument in
the caller).
Finally, use this now sanely named function in the NTB code, which
mis-used a user copy version (with STAC/CLAC and all) of this interface
despite it not actually being a user copy at all. |
| Confused deputy in DevTools in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| A flaw was found in the ChunkReader component of the Undertow web server, which is used to handle chunked transfer encoding in HTTP requests. The issue occurs because a security check for the chunk size is performed before the value is shifted, allowing a specifically crafted 15-digit chunk size to bypass the limit and overflow into internal state flags. This can cause the server to terminate a request body prematurely and interpret the remaining data as a separate, smuggled request. |
| HTTP::Body versions before 1.23_01 for Perl lose track of chunk boundaries in chunked request bodies when a read ends inside a chunk.
In chunked mode, used when no content length is given, add() treats a chunk as complete once the buffer is as long as the chunk's declared size, but the buffer still holds the chunk-size line. When a read ends in the last bytes of a chunk, add() takes the chunk short and parses the leftover data as the next chunk-size line.
A remote attacker can make a chunked body never complete, hanging a server that reads until the body is done, and may make it complete early, leaving the remaining bytes to be read as the next request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: quirks: Add quirk for 2 Chicony Electronics HP 5MP Cameras
The Chicony Electronics HP 5MP Cameras (USB ID 04F2:B824 & 04F2:B82C)
report a HID sensor interface that is not actually implemented.
Attempting to access this non-functional sensor via iio_info causes
system hangs as runtime PM tries to wake up an unresponsive sensor.
Add these 2 devices to the HID ignore list since the sensor interface is
non-functional by design and should not be exposed to userspace. |
| A flaw was found in libsoup. A remote attacker could exploit an unsigned to signed conversion error in the `soup_body_input_stream_read_chunked()` function by sending a malicious HTTP request. This vulnerability occurs when libsoup operates behind a non-libsoup proxy server or as a proxy in front of a non-libsoup backend server. Successful exploitation can allow an attacker to bypass security controls, poison web caches, or gain unauthorized access. |
| In hasInteractAcrossUsersFullPermission of AppInfoBase.java, there is a possible cross-user permission bypass due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. |
| In executeRequest of ActivityStarter.java, there is a possible launch anywhere due to a confused deputy. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is needed for exploitation. |
| A flaw was found in SoupServer. This HTTP request smuggling vulnerability occurs because SoupServer improperly handles requests that combine Transfer-Encoding: chunked and Connection: keep-alive headers. A remote, unauthenticated client can exploit this by sending specially crafted requests, causing SoupServer to fail to close the connection as required by RFC 9112. This allows the attacker to smuggle additional requests over the persistent connection, leading to unintended request processing and potential denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. |
| Confused deputy in WebUI in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| A flaw was found in the ChunkReader component of the Undertow HTTP server, which is used by WildFly and JBoss EAP to handle chunked transfer encoding. The issue occurs because the parser uses a single internal variable to store both the remaining chunk size and state flags. By sending a specially crafted request with an extremely large chunk size, an attacker can cause these values to overlap, tricking the parser into thinking a request has finished prematurely. This can allow a second, "smuggled" request to be processed out of sync, potentially bypassing security controls. |
| A flaw was found in SoupServer (libsoup). When an HTTP/1.x client sends a request with Expect: 100-continue and a request body, and SoupServer returns an early final (non-1xx) response before the body is read, the server neither drains the declared body bytes nor closes the connection. On a keep-alive connection, those leftover bytes are interpreted as a subsequent HTTP request. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can place a complete HTTP request in the body and cause SoupServer to process that smuggled request, leading to unintended request handling. |
| Confused deputy in BackgroundFetch in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.38 allowed a remote attacker to potentially bypass web origin policy via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| A flaw was found in Quarkus-HTTP, which incorrectly parses cookies with
certain value-delimiting characters in incoming requests. This issue could
allow an attacker to construct a cookie value to exfiltrate HttpOnly cookie
values or spoof arbitrary additional cookie values, leading to unauthorized
data access or modification. The main threat from this flaw impacts data
confidentiality and integrity. |
| uhttpd is a small HTTP server. In unpatched repository snapshots, `uh_ubus_data_send()` in `ubus.c` can desynchronize HTTP request boundaries when a `POST /ubus` JSON body arrives in multiple TCP segments. An initial segment completing a JSON object sets `du->jsobj`; a later segment takes the existing-object parse-error path and returns zero bytes consumed. The caller neither drains the remaining declared `Content-Length` nor sets `connection_close`. An HTTP request embedded in the unread body suffix is consequently processed as a new request on the same keep-alive connection. The reported reproducer returned a JSON-RPC parse error followed by a second HTTP response. This application-layer body-handler flaw is distinct from Transfer-Encoding header case handling and chunk-length state reset, and affects deployments enabling ubus, including the default OpenWrt configuration and potential proxy/CDN deployments. Repository patches 7b1bec45826bd78c8afc993435bdc0f1df2fe399 and b2285de129b9adc8b12f84f9a27c16c21f2b57a5 address this issue. |
| Echo is a Go web framework. From 4.0.0 until 4.16.1 and 5.4.1, Echo's Proxy middleware selects a raw tunnel from a client WebSocket upgrade request before verifying that the configured upstream accepted the upgrade. If the upstream rejects the upgrade with an ordinary keep-alive response, later HTTP requests on the connection are sent directly to that upstream without passing through Echo's router or route-specific middleware. This can bypass authentication or authorization enforced only by Echo routes, but requires an accessible proxy route, a cooperating rejected-upgrade response, and a target without independent upstream authorization. This issue is fixed in 4.16.1 and 5.4.1. |