| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Bounds-check devid in __rlookup_amd_iommu()
iommu_device_register() walks every device on the PCI bus via
bus_for_each_dev() and calls amd_iommu_probe_device() for each. The
inlined check_device() path computes the device's sbdf, calls
rlookup_amd_iommu() to find the owning IOMMU, and only afterwards
verifies devid <= pci_seg->last_bdf. __rlookup_amd_iommu() indexes
rlookup_table[devid] with no bounds check of its own, so for a PCI
device whose BDF is not described by the IVRS, the lookup reads past
the end of the allocation before the caller's bounds check can run.
This was harmless before commit e874c666b15b ("iommu/amd: Change
rlookup, irq_lookup, and alias to use kvalloc()"): the table was a
zeroed page-order allocation, so the over-read returned NULL and the
caller's NULL check skipped the device. After that commit the table is
a tight kvcalloc() and the over-read returns adjacent slab contents,
which check_device() then dereferences as a struct amd_iommu *,
causing a boot-time GPF.
Seen on Google Compute Engine ct6e VMs, where the virtualized IVRS
describes only the four TPU endpoints 00:04.0-07.0; the gVNIC at
00:08.0 (devid 0x40) indexes 56 bytes past the 456-byte allocation,
into the adjacent kmalloc-512 slab object:
pci 0000:00:04.0: Adding to iommu group 0
pci 0000:00:05.0: Adding to iommu group 1
pci 0000:00:06.0: Adding to iommu group 2
pci 0000:00:07.0: Adding to iommu group 3
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x3a64695f78746382: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.18.22 #1
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 12/06/2025
RIP: 0010:amd_iommu_probe_device+0x54/0x3a0
Call Trace:
__iommu_probe_device+0x107/0x520
probe_iommu_group+0x29/0x50
bus_for_each_dev+0x7e/0xe0
iommu_device_register+0xc9/0x240
iommu_go_to_state+0x9c0/0x1c60
amd_iommu_init+0x14/0x40
pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x60
do_one_initcall+0x47/0x2f0
Guard the array access in __rlookup_amd_iommu(). With the fix applied
on 6.18.22, the gVNIC at 00:08.0 is skipped cleanly and the VM boots. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/802/mrp: fix vector attribute parsing in mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr
In mrp_pdu_parse_vecattr(), vector attribute events are encoded three
per byte and valen tracks the number of events left to process.
The parser decrements valen after processing the first and second events
from each event byte, but not after processing the third one. When valen
is exactly a multiple of three, the loop continues after the last valid
event and consumes the next byte as a new event byte, applying a
spurious event to the MRP applicant state.
Additionally, when valen is zero the parser unconditionally consumes
attrlen bytes as FirstValue and advances the offset, even though per
IEEE 802.1ak a VectorAttribute with only a LeaveAllEvent has valen of
zero and no FirstValue or Vector fields. This corrupts the offset for
subsequent PDU parsing.
Also, when valen exceeds three the loop crosses byte boundaries but
the attribute value is not incremented between the last event of one
byte and the first event of the next. This causes the first event of
the next byte to use the same attribute value as the third event
rather than the next consecutive value.
Decrement valen after processing the third event, skip FirstValue
consumption when valen is zero, and increment the attribute value at
the end of each loop iteration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject BR/EDR signaling packets over MTUsig
net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:l2cap_sig_channel() accepts BR/EDR
signaling packets up to the channel MTU and dispatches each command
without enforcing the signaling MTU (MTUsig). A Bluetooth BR/EDR peer
within radio range can send a fixed-channel CID 0x0001 packet that is
larger than MTUsig and contains many L2CAP_ECHO_REQ commands before
pairing. In a real-radio stock-kernel run, one 681-byte signaling
packet containing 168 zero-length ECHO_REQ commands made the target
transmit 168 ECHO_RSP frames over about 220 ms.
Impact: a Bluetooth BR/EDR peer within radio range, before pairing, can
force 168 ECHO_RSP frames from one 681-byte fixed-channel signaling
packet containing packed ECHO_REQ commands.
Define Linux's BR/EDR signaling MTU as the spec minimum of 48 bytes and
reject any larger signaling packet with one L2CAP_COMMAND_REJECT_RSP
carrying L2CAP_REJ_MTU_EXCEEDED before any command is dispatched.
The Bluetooth Core spec wording for MTUExceeded says the reject
identifier shall match the first request command in the packet, and
that packets containing only responses shall be silently discarded.
Linux intentionally deviates from that prescription: silently
discarding desynchronizes the peer because the remote stack never
learns its responses were dropped, and locating the first request
command requires walking command headers past MTUsig, i.e. processing
bytes from a packet we have already decided is too large to process.
We therefore always emit one reject and use the identifier from the
first command header, a single fixed-offset byte read.
The unrestricted BR/EDR signaling parser and ECHO_REQ response path both
trace to the initial git import; no later introducing commit is
available for a Fixes tag. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Clamp VBIOS HDMI retimer register count to array size
[Why & How]
The VBIOS integrated info tables (v1_11 and v2_1) contain HdmiRegNum and
Hdmi6GRegNum fields that are used as loop bounds when copying retimer I2C
register settings into fixed-size arrays (dp*_ext_hdmi_reg_settings[9]
and dp*_ext_hdmi_6g_reg_settings[3]). These u8 fields are not validated
before use, so a malformed VBIOS can specify values up to 255, causing an
out-of-bounds heap write during driver probe.
Clamp each register count to the destination array size using min_t()
before the copy loops, in both get_integrated_info_v11() and
get_integrated_info_v2_1().
(cherry picked from commit 5a7f0ef90195940c54b0f5bb85b87da55f038c69) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: reject short IPv4/IPv6 inputs in bpf_prog_test_run_skb
bpf_prog_test_run_skb() calls eth_type_trans() first and then uses
skb->protocol to initialize sk family and address fields for the test
run.
For IPv4 and IPv6 packets, it may access ip_hdr(skb) or ipv6_hdr(skb)
even when the provided test input only contains an Ethernet header.
Reject the input earlier if the Ethernet frame carries IPv4/IPv6
EtherType but the L3 header is too short.
Fold the IPv4/IPv6 header length checks into the existing protocol
switch and return -EINVAL before accessing the network headers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: usb-audio: Bound MIDI 2.0 endpoint descriptor scans
The USB MIDI 2.0 endpoint parser has the same descriptor walking
pattern as the legacy MIDI parser. It validates bLength against
bNumGrpTrmBlock before reading baAssoGrpTrmBlkID[], but not against the
remaining bytes in the endpoint-extra scan.
A malformed device can therefore make later baAssoGrpTrmBlkID[] reads
consume bytes past the walked descriptor.
Reject zero-length and overlong descriptors while walking endpoint
extras. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Reject SIOCATMARK on non-stream sockets
SIOCATMARK reports whether the receive queue is at the urgent mark for
MSG_OOB.
In AF_UNIX, MSG_OOB is supported only for SOCK_STREAM sockets.
SOCK_DGRAM and SOCK_SEQPACKET reject MSG_OOB in sendmsg() and recvmsg(),
so they should not support SIOCATMARK either.
Return -EOPNOTSUPP for non-stream sockets before checking the receive
queue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix zero-size GDS range init on RDNA4
RDNA4 (GFX 12) hardware removes the GDS, GWS, and OA on-chip memory
resources. The gfx_v12_0 initialisation code correctly leaves
adev->gds.gds_size, adev->gds.gws_size, and adev->gds.oa_size at
zero to reflect this.
amdgpu_ttm_init() unconditionally calls amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() for
each of these resources regardless of size. When the size is zero,
amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() forwards the call to ttm_range_man_init(),
which calls drm_mm_init(mm, 0, 0). drm_mm_init() immediately fires
DRM_MM_BUG_ON(start + size <= start) -- trivially true when size is
zero -- crashing the kernel during modprobe of amdgpu on an RX 9070 XT.
Guard against this by returning 0 early from
amdgpu_ttm_init_on_chip() when size_in_page is zero. This skips TTM
resource manager registration for hardware resources that are absent,
without affecting any other GPU type.
DRM_MM_BUG_ON() only asserts if CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MM is enabled in
the kernel config. This is apparently rarely enabled as these chips
have been in the market for over a year and this issue was only reported
now.
Oops-Analysis: http://oops.fenrus.org/reports/bugzilla.korg/221376/report.html
(cherry picked from commit 5719ce5865279cad4fd5f01011fe037168503f2d) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma4: replace BUG_ON with WARN_ON in fence emission
sdma_v4_0_ring_emit_fence() contains two BUG_ON(addr & 0x3) assertions
that verify fence writeback addresses are dword-aligned. These
assertions can be reached from unprivileged userspace via crafted
DRM_IOCTL_AMDGPU_CS submissions, causing a fatal kernel panic in a
scheduler worker thread.
Replace both BUG_ON() calls with WARN_ON() to log the condition without
crashing the kernel. A misaligned fence address at this point indicates
a driver bug, but crashing the kernel is never the correct response when
the assertion is reachable from userspace.
The CS IOCTL path is the correct place to filter invalid submissions;
the ring emission callback is too late to do anything about it.
(cherry picked from commit b90250bd933afd1ba94d86d6b13821997b22b18e) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: authencesn - reject short ahash digests during instance creation
authencesn requires either a zero authsize or an authsize of at least
4 bytes because the ESN encrypt/decrypt paths always move 4 bytes of
high-order sequence number data at the end of the authenticated data.
While crypto_authenc_esn_setauthsize() already rejects explicit
non-zero authsizes in the range 1..3, crypto_authenc_esn_create()
still copied auth->digestsize into inst->alg.maxauthsize without
validating it. The AEAD core then initialized the tfm's default
authsize from that value.
As a result, selecting an ahash with digest size 1..3, such as
cbcmac(cipher_null), exposed authencesn instances whose default
authsize was invalid even though setauthsize() would have rejected the
same value. AF_ALG could then trigger the ESN tail handling with a
too-short tag and hit an out-of-bounds access.
Reject authencesn instances whose ahash digest size is in the invalid
non-zero range 1..3 so that no tfm can inherit an unsupported default
authsize. |
| A stack-based buffer overflow in Thales SafeNet Authentication Client (SAC) SIS token engine processing can be triggered by a malicious physical or software-emulated smart card. The issue can occur before authentication or PIN entry and may
cause a denial of service or potentially arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the affected process. Affected releases start with SAC 10.8 R7 and include SAC 10.9 R3 GA (build 10.9.7449). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking
catc_probe() fills three URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_sndbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) and usb_rcvbulkpipe(usbdev, 1) for TX/RX
- usb_rcvintpipe(usbdev, 2) for interrupt status
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a catc_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic constants
throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and usb_check_int_endpoints()
calls after usb_set_interface() to verify endpoint types before use,
rejecting devices with mismatched descriptors at probe time.
Similar to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
which fixed the issue in rtl8150. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_set_rbtree: check for partial overlaps in anonymous sets
Userspace provides an optimized representation in case intervals are
adjacent, where the end element is omitted.
The existing partial overlap detection logic skips anonymous set checks
on start elements for this reason.
However, it is possible to add intervals that overlap to this anonymous
where two start elements with the same, eg. A-B, A-C where C < B.
start end
A B
start end
A C
Restore the check on overlapping start elements to report an overlap. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE when accessing forward path array
Although unlikely, recent support for IPIP tunnels increases chances of
reaching this WARN_ON_ONCE if userspace manages to build a sufficiently
long forward path.
Remove it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: fix divide-by-zero in tipc_sk_filter_connect()
A user can set conn_timeout to any value via
setsockopt(TIPC_CONN_TIMEOUT), including values less than 4. When a
SYN is rejected with TIPC_ERR_OVERLOAD and the retry path in
tipc_sk_filter_connect() executes:
delay %= (tsk->conn_timeout / 4);
If conn_timeout is in the range [0, 3], the integer division yields 0,
and the modulo operation triggers a divide-by-zero exception, causing a
kernel oops/panic.
Fix this by clamping conn_timeout to a minimum of 4 at the point of use
in tipc_sk_filter_connect().
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: poc-F144 Not tainted 7.0.0-rc2+
RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_filter_rcv (net/tipc/socket.c:2236 net/tipc/socket.c:2362)
Call Trace:
tipc_sk_backlog_rcv (include/linux/instrumented.h:82 include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:32 include/net/sock.h:2357 net/tipc/socket.c:2406)
__release_sock (include/net/sock.h:1185 net/core/sock.c:3213)
release_sock (net/core/sock.c:3797)
tipc_connect (net/tipc/socket.c:2570)
__sys_connect (include/linux/file.h:62 include/linux/file.h:83 net/socket.c:2098) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: add upper bound check on user inputs in signal ioctl
Huge input values in amdgpu_userq_signal_ioctl can lead to a OOM and
could be exploited.
So check these input value against AMDGPU_USERQ_MAX_HANDLES
which is big enough value for genuine use cases and could
potentially avoid OOM.
(cherry picked from commit be267e15f99bc97cbe202cd556717797cdcf79a5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Ignore -EBUSY when checking nested events from vcpu_block()
Ignore -EBUSY when checking nested events after exiting a blocking state
while L2 is active, as exiting to userspace will generate a spurious
userspace exit, usually with KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN, and likely lead to the VM's
demise. Continuing with the wakeup isn't perfect either, as *something*
has gone sideways if a vCPU is awakened in L2 with an injected event (or
worse, a nested run pending), but continuing on gives the VM a decent
chance of surviving without any major side effects.
As explained in the Fixes commits, it _should_ be impossible for a vCPU to
be put into a blocking state with an already-injected event (exception,
IRQ, or NMI). Unfortunately, userspace can stuff MP_STATE and/or injected
events, and thus put the vCPU into what should be an impossible state.
Don't bother trying to preserve the WARN, e.g. with an anti-syzkaller
Kconfig, as WARNs can (hopefully) be added in paths where _KVM_ would be
violating x86 architecture, e.g. by WARNing if KVM attempts to inject an
exception or interrupt while the vCPU isn't running. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Add signal type check for dcn401 get_phyd32clk_src
Trying to access link enc on a dpia link will cause a crash otherwise |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: validate user queue size constraints
Add validation to ensure user queue sizes meet hardware requirements:
- Size must be a power of two for efficient ring buffer wrapping
- Size must be at least AMDGPU_GPU_PAGE_SIZE to prevent undersized allocations
This prevents invalid configurations that could lead to GPU faults or
unexpected behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: pegasus: enable basic endpoint checking
pegasus_probe() fills URBs with hardcoded endpoint pipes without
verifying the endpoint descriptors:
- usb_rcvbulkpipe(dev, 1) for RX data
- usb_sndbulkpipe(dev, 2) for TX data
- usb_rcvintpipe(dev, 3) for status interrupts
A malformed USB device can present these endpoints with transfer types
that differ from what the driver assumes.
Add a pegasus_usb_ep enum for endpoint numbers, replacing magic
constants throughout. Add usb_check_bulk_endpoints() and
usb_check_int_endpoints() calls before any resource allocation to
verify endpoint types before use, rejecting devices with mismatched
descriptors at probe time, and avoid triggering assertion.
Similar fix to
- commit 90b7f2961798 ("net: usb: rtl8150: enable basic endpoint checking")
- commit 9e7021d2aeae ("net: usb: catc: enable basic endpoint checking") |