| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Do not credit control-record octets to the RPC stream
svc_tcp_sock_recv_cmsg() receives up to two octets into a local
buffer, and returns that count for any record type other than
TLS_RECORD_TYPE_ALERT. Nothing reached the caller's buffer, but
svc_tcp_read_marker() adds the count to sk_tcplen and
svc_tcp_read_msg()'s caller adds it to sk_datalen. The RPC stream
advances over octets it never received. The fragment marker is
assembled from stale sk_marker octets. The message body comes from
pages nothing wrote.
A conforming client reaches this. RFC 8446 Section 4.6.3 lets either
peer send KeyUpdate once it has sent its Finished, and svcsock has no
rekey path. kTLS leaves the partially consumed record on ctx->rx_list,
so the body drains two octets per svc_tcp_recvfrom() call. Each pair
is credited the same way.
Return -EAGAIN for a record that is not an alert. That is what
svc_tcp_sock_process_cmsg()'s default arm returned before the receive
moved into a local buffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: fix oversized GSS proxy token copy
gss_read_proxy_verf() allocates one page per token chunk, but it copies the
entire linear head of an RPC request into in_token->pages[0]. A UDP datagram
can leave more than PAGE_SIZE bytes in the linear head, so a large
RPCSEC_GSS INIT token overwrites following pages.
Copy the linear head in page-sized chunks before switching to the request
page array. The linear head itself can span multiple pages. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: pin gss module across auth_domain RCU free
A gss auth_domain stores a raw pointer to svcauthops_gss in
dom->flavour, and its release queues svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu()
via call_rcu(). Both live in auth_rpcgss.ko text, and nothing pins the
module while a domain referencing it is reachable. rmmod auth_rpcgss
can therefore unmap that text while an NFSD export still holds a
reference to the domain.
The export cache is one such holder. When the export is finally
released, the domain reference drops from module text:
svc_export_put()
auth_domain_put(exp->ex_client)
auth_domain_release()
dom->flavour->domain_release(dom) /* into module text */
svcauth_gss_domain_release()
call_rcu(&dom->rcu_head,
svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu)
Once auth_rpcgss is unloaded, the domain_release call lands in
unmapped memory. The rcu_barrier() in exit_rpcsec_gss() does not
help: it waits only for callbacks already queued, and this one is
not queued until the export goes away.
NFSD's NFSv4 objects import symbols from auth_rpcgss.ko, so only a
server built without CONFIG_NFSD_V4 can unload auth_rpcgss while
exports still name a gss domain.
Take a module reference in svcauth_gss_register_pseudoflavor() before
publishing the domain and drop it at the end of
svcauth_gss_domain_release_rcu(). The rcu_barrier() then holds the
module image until this callback has returned.
[ cel: rewrote description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: Reject a socket that already has an svc_sock attached
Writing the same socket descriptor to /proc/fs/nfsd/portlist twice
attaches a second svc_sock to one socket. svc_setup_socket() saves
the socket's callbacks before installing its own, so the second
attach records svc_write_space() as the old write_space callback.
svc_udp_init() invokes that callback by way of svc_sock_setbufsize(),
and svc_write_space() then calls itself until the kernel stack is
exhausted:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ffffc900037d7ff8
svc_write_space+0x90/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:429
svc_write_space+0xe6/0x2b0 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:430
... 700 more ...
svc_sock_setbufsize+0x18d/0x220 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:386
svc_udp_init net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:854 [inline]
svc_setup_socket+0xb2f/0x1090 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1498
svc_addsock+0x2fd/0x760 net/sunrpc/svcsock.c:1547
__write_ports_addfd fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:742 [inline]
write_ports+0xa5b/0xcc0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:861
nfsctl_transaction_write+0x106/0x1a0 fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c:112
svc_data_ready() and svc_tcp_state_change() chain through their saved
callbacks the same way, so a TCP descriptor added twice recurses on
the next incoming segment instead. Reaching any of this takes a
writer on portlist, and the nfsd filesystem sets no FS_USERNS_MOUNT,
so the reproducer needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the initial user namespace.
Reject a socket that already carries sk_user_data. svc_setup_socket()
overwrites that field unconditionally, so a socket some other
consumer has claimed is one NFSD would corrupt whether or not the
callbacks recurse. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: trace an accepted transport before publishing it
svc_handle_xprt() publishes a newly accepted transport before tracing
it. svc_add_new_temp_xprt() places the transport on sv_tempsocks and
clears XPT_BUSY, so another nfsd thread can dequeue it at once. If the
peer has already closed the connection, that thread runs
svc_delete_xprt(), which drops the list reference, the only reference
the new transport holds. trace_svc_xprt_accept() then reads the
transport's addresses and network namespace from freed memory.
Before publication the accepting thread owns the transport
exclusively: XPT_BUSY is still set from svc_xprt_init() and the
transport is on no list. Emit the tracepoint there.
[ cel: trace before publication instead of taking an extra reference ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sunrpc: treat empty auth.unix.gid replies as negative entries
When rpc.mountd cannot resolve a uid (getpwuid() or getgrouplist()
failure, e.g. while winbind or sssd is briefly unreachable), it
answers the auth.unix.gid upcall with zero groups. unix_gid_parse()
installs that as a valid positive entry, and svcauth_unix_set_client()
then replaces the credential's group list with the empty one on
every request, RPCSEC_GSS included via svcauth_gss_set_client().
One failed lookup strips that uid of all supplementary groups on
every export for up to mountd's configured TTL (30 minutes by
default), long after the NSS backend has recovered.
mountd cannot send an empty list for a successful lookup, since
getgrouplist(3) always includes at least the user's primary group,
so a zero-group reply can only mean the lookup failed. Record it as
a negative entry: unix_gid_find() then returns -ENOENT and
svcauth_unix_set_client() keeps the groups the RPC credential
already carries. This is the fallback that
commit 3fc605a2aa38 ("[PATCH] knfsd: allow the server to provide a
gid list when using AUTH_UNIX authentication") promised when no
answer is available, and the same state try_to_negate_entry()
already creates when no listener holds the channel open. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix update of call->tx_pending without holding lock
Currently, rxrpc_send_data() updates call->tx_pending just before it
returns - but it won't be holding the call->user_mutex when it does this if
a wait was interrupted by a signal. This would allow a parallel sendmsg()
to race.
Further, both the callers of rxrpc_send_data() call it with the lock held,
and then it returns an indication through the parameter list to say whether
it has dropped the lock or not - after which the callers both just drop the
lock if it's still held.
Fix this by:
(1) Moving the release of call->user_mutex down into rxrpc_send_data() and
get rid of the indicator parameter. This makes it easier to see where
the lock is held.
(2) After waiting, if the attempt to reacquire the mutex is interrupted,
just return directly there rather than going to out_unlock
(3) Restricting the txb variable to inside the buffering loop and leaving
->tx_pending set until we've queued the buffer.
Note that there's a slight change in behaviour in that wait_for_space
failure now doesn't check for completion because it doesn't hold the call
user_mutex. The caller, however, should re-issue the send and pick up any
error at a second attempt. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix lack of short-send handling in rxrpc_kernel_send_data()
Fix rxrpc_kernel_send_data() to loop around if it detects a short send.
David Laight suggested doing it here rather than wrapping all the calls in
loops. Further, remove the len argument and use the iterator count instead
and return 0 on success, not the amount copied.
Note this is also a prerequisite for changing the way rxrpc_send_data()
works to return a short send rather than an error if some data was
buffered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix afs to abort the rxrpc call on send error
Fix afs_send_empty_reply() and afs_send_simple_reply() to always try to
abort the rxrpc call rather than just aborting on -ENOMEM and otherwise
abandoning it. If the call is already complete due to network failure or a
received abort, this will do nothing.
Also make afs_make_call() always abort on send error; again, it does
nothing if the rxrpc call is already dead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: x86: hdmi: fix chmap array missing terminator entry
had_build_channel_allocation_map() allocates a single struct
snd_pcm_chmap_elem via kzalloc() and stores it as
intelhaddata->chmap->chmap. struct snd_pcm_chmap.chmap is expected to
be a zero-terminated array (see snd_pcm_std_chmaps[]), but
had_register_chmap_ctls() never overrides the TLV callback installed
by snd_pcm_add_chmap_ctls(), so the generic pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() from
ALSA core is left in place.
pcm_chmap_ctl_tlv() is reachable by any local user via
SNDRV_CTL_IOCTL_TLV_READ on the "Playback Channel Map" control and
walks the array with "for (map = info->chmap; map->channels; map++)".
Since the driver's single element is never terminated, this walks
past the allocation. The same pointer is also freed on hot-unplug and
rebuilt on hot-plug under intelhaddata->mutex, while the TLV callback
runs under card->controls_rwsem without that mutex, so the walk can
also race a concurrent free of the array.
Fix this by allocating a second, zeroed element so the array is
properly terminated, and by dropping the inherited TLV callback
entirely at registration time, since the driver never implements one
of its own. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SVM: Trigger new ASID allocation in both VMCBs on pCPU switch
When the pCPU where the VMCB was most recently used is switched, reset
the ASID generation in both VMCBs, triggering new ASID allocation for
the immediate VMRUN as well as the next VMRUN on the other VMCB.
The ASID is shared between vmcb01 and vmcb02, and gets flushed on every
nested transition. However, since pCPU tracking is done per VMCB, it is
possible for one VMCB to allocate a new ASID when migrated to a new
pCPU, and then the other VMCB reuses that ASID on the old pCPU. This can
result in the same ASID being used by multiple vCPUs on the old pCPU.
Example scenario:
- vCPU runs on pCPU A, vmcb01 is active, asid=1.
- vCPU migrates to pCPU B, vmcb01 pCPU changes, new asid=2.
- Another vCPU runs on pCPU A and allocates asid=2 as well.
- vCPU migrates back to pCPU A, and then switches to vmcb02 before it
runs again with vmcb01.
- No pCPU switch is detected for vmcb02, so VMRUN is done with asid=2.
- Two vCPUs end up using asid=2 on the same pCPU.
Keep the VMCB dirtying to the active VMCB only. Clean bits are tracked
by a pCPU for each VMCB, so do not unnecessarily dirty a VMCB if its
pCPU does not change.
Additionally, initialize the tracked pCPU for vmcb02 to -1 on nested
enablement as hardening, so that a new ASID allocation is always
triggered when nested is disabled and re-enabled.
No performance regression was noticed when overcommitting L1 vCPUs in L0
(to force rescheduling), pinning L1 <-> L2 vCPUs, and running CPUID in a
tight loop bouncing between 2 vCPUs in L2.
An alternative (and perhaps more proper) fix would be tracking the ASID
per-VMCB instead (e.g. [1]). However, that's a more involved change, and
it would result in having different ASIDs for L1 and L2 without actually
properly maintaining them. It would probably work because all TLB
flushes target the current VMCB, and the other VMCB is always flushed on
nested transitions, but the code ends up in an arguably more fragile
state. Punt a proper clean fix to an incoming (and overdue) overhaul of
SVM's ASID usage [2].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20250205182402.2147495-2-yosry.ahmed@linux.dev
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/20260728003557.1136583-1-yosry@kernel.org |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if L1 has EFER.LMA=1 && EFER.LME=0
Reject KVM_SET_NESTED_STATE if the incoming L1 host state has what is
effectively an impossible EFER combination of LMA=1 but LME=0, i.e. if the
state says long mode is active but not enabled. Unlike VMX, SVM doesn't
have an explicit consistent check for the illegal combination; presumably
hardware simply ignores EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0.
Unfortunately, KVM doesn't ignore EFER.LMA in this case and consumes the
illegal state when constructing the shadow MMU for L2. E.g. if userspace
also clears CR4.PAE, then kvm_calc_cpu_role() will compute a role with 4 or
5 levels of paging, but shadow_mmu_init_context() will wire up the MMU to
use the paging32 template, which maxes out its levels at 2.
Note, the "real badness" is effectively the same as what happened with the
nVMX bug fixed by commit 112e66017bff ("KVM: nVMX: add missing consistency
checks for CR0 and CR4"). Unfortunately, the sanity check added by commit
72e2fb24a0b0 ("KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if a vCPU ends up in long mode
without PAE enabled") doesn't work for this case, since L2 state is active
at the time of the page fault, but it's L1 that has the bad state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: nSVM: Ignore EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state
Force EFER.LMA=0 if EFER.LME=0 when preparing L2 state for VMRUN, i.e.
mimic real hardware's behavior of ignoring EFER.LMA if EFER.LME=0. VMRUN
unfortunately allows the nonsensical combination, i.e. doesn't fail, but
KVM itself has an invariant EFER.LMA can be set et if and only if EFER.LME
is set. Breaking that invariant can lead to a variety of issue,
particularly in MMU code that keys off EFER.LMA when determining whether to
emulate/virtualization 4/5-level paging versus PAE paging. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Bug the VM if KVM attempts to walk more levels than the MMU has
Extend the "EFER.LMA && !CR4.PAE" check, which exists largely to guard
against KVM configuring a paging32 MMU with more than 2 levels of paging,
with a very explicit check for exactly that: that KVM isn't trying to walk
more levels of paging than the MMU template provides. I.e. harden KVM
against all bugs that would cause KVM to generates accesses beyond the
bounds of guest_walker's arrays, regardless of how KVM ended up with the
misconfigured MMU.
Note, don't use w->cpu_role.base.level directly as the paging64 template
only provides two levels of page tables for PAE paging on 32-bit hosts, and
handles the third level by manually emulating the PDPTR access. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/xen: Enforce 4-byte alignment of vcpu_info registration
Xen's map_guest_area() enforces that vcpu_info is aligned to
sizeof(xen_ulong_t). KVM has no such check, allowing a guest to
register vcpu_info at an arbitrary byte alignment.
Enforce unconditional 4-byte alignment regardless of the current
shinfo mode. This is sufficient because subsequent commits ensure
that all locked atomic operations on vcpu_info fields use at most
32-bit accesses. Return -ENXIO on failure, matching Xen's
map_guest_area() behaviour for unaligned requests.
Originally observed in review of an unrelated patch:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260604193554.1BA311F00893@smtp.kernel.org/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Request event processing for exception VM-Exits
Request event processing whenever kvm_queue_exception_vmexit() queues an
exception VM-Exit. Most callers reach the helper through
kvm_multiple_exception(), which already sets KVM_REQ_EVENT, but nested
asynchronous page faults call it directly.
Without another event request, vcpu_enter_guest() skips
kvm_check_and_inject_events() and re-enters L2. A subsequent VM-Exit can
clear the pending exception while reconstructing vectoring state, losing
the synthetic #PF VM-Exit. The APF reason remains PAGE_NOT_PRESENT and a
later regular #PF can consume the stale value.
Setting KVM_REQ_EVENT in the common helper ensures that L1 receives the
queued VM-Exit before KVM re-enters L2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Take SRCU in kvm_zap_gfn_range()
kvm_zap_gfn_range() walks memslots and rmaps and may drop mmu_lock to
reschedule. Callers that do not already hold kvm->srcu (or slots_lock)
can race with memslot deletion: synchronize_srcu_expedited() does not
wait, kvm_free_memslot() frees the old slot and its rmap, and the zap
resumes on freed memory.
The VFIO noncoherent-DMA path hits this by zapping the entire GPA
space without SRCU. KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: vmalloc-out-of-bounds in slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffffc900005c1008
Call Trace:
slot_rmap_walk_next+0x82/0x1c0
__kvm_rmap_zap_gfn_range+0x17a/0x280
kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x2a6/0x6a0
kvm_vfio_set_attr+0x576/0x770
kvm_device_ioctl+0x1ff/0x3b0
Take SRCU inside kvm_zap_gfn_range() so every caller is covered.
Nesting with an existing kvm->srcu critical section is fine; the
helper uses a local index. Drop the now-redundant SRCU pair from
__kvm_set_or_clear_apicv_inhibit(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86: Zero reserved synic flags when delivering message to avoid stack leak
Ensure all reserved flags are zeroed when setting the msg_pending flag as
part of SynIC message delivery, as setting only msg_pending can leak seven
bits of kernel stack data to the guest. E.g. gcc typically uses a
bitwise-OR to set the msg_pending flag, without initializing the on-stack
variable.
Precisely zero the flags, e.g. as opposed to zeroing the entire structure,
to make it somewhat more obvious that the flags *need* to be zeroed. E.g.
it would be quite easy to misread the initial read of guest memory and
think that zeroing the entire structure is completely superfluous. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: TDX: Enable Notify VM exit
Enable Notify VM exit functionality for TDX guests.
Notify VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can
enable Notify VM exit through KVM_CAP_X86_NOTIFY_VMEXIT when it's
reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP just
based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between VMX
and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap for
TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually
enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the
relevant TD VMCS fields.
Enable Notify VM exit for TDX guests by:
- Invoking TDX module API calls to set NOTIFY_VM_EXITING and Notify
Window in TD VMCS. It's done in tdx_vcpu_init() where other TD VMCS
bits are set. Since TDX vCPU cannot be reset, it only needs to be
configured once when initializing the TDX vCPU.
- Adding corresponding exit handler for TDX Notify VM Exit.
Notify VM exit can happen when executing the IRET instruction. If the
IRET unblocks the NMI blocking state, bit 12 of the exit qualification
is set. In this case, the VMM needs to restore the "blocked by NMI" state
when it decides to re-enter the guest. For TDX, KVM cannot manage the
GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO and it's TDX module's responsibility to
handle it. Extract the common part without NMI blocking handling into a
helper in common.h so that it can be shared between VMX and TDX.
Note, KVM uses "pre-production" terminology for the feature formally called
Notify VM-Exit. All public versions of the SDM refer to the feature as
Instruction Timeout. This will be remedied in the near future, for now,
use KVM's terminology for consistency.
Note, #2, there is no enumeration bit for Notify VM exit by TDX module
because all TDX modules support it, and allow to set the corresponding
TD VMCS fields as long as the hardware supports the feature. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: TDX: Enable Bus Lock VM exit
Enable Bus Lock VM exit functionality for TDX guests.
Bus Lock VM exit is an existing feature supported by KVM. Userspace can
enable Bus Lock VM exit through KVM_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION_EXIT when it's
reported as supported. However, KVM reports the support of this CAP
just based on the hardware capability but doesn't differentiate between
VMX and TDX. This leads to the issue that userspace can enable this cap
for TDX guests without getting an error, but the feature is not actually
enabled because KVM doesn't call the TDX module API to program the
relevant TD VMCS fields.
Enable Bus Lock VM exit for TDX guests by programming the
BUS_LOCK_DETECTION control in the TD VMCS and by adding the exit handler.
Note, there is no enumeration bit for this feature by TDX module because
all TDX modules support it and allow to set the TD VMCS as long as the
hardware supports the feature. |