| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: fix ttm_bo calltrace warning in psp_hw_fini
The call trace occurs when the amdgpu is removed after
the mode1 reset. During mode1 reset, from suspend to resume,
there is no need to reinitialize the ta firmware buffer
which caused the bo pin_count increase redundantly.
[ 489.885525] Call Trace:
[ 489.885525] <TASK>
[ 489.885526] amdttm_bo_put+0x34/0x50 [amdttm]
[ 489.885529] amdgpu_bo_free_kernel+0xe8/0x130 [amdgpu]
[ 489.885620] psp_free_shared_bufs+0xb7/0x150 [amdgpu]
[ 489.885720] psp_hw_fini+0xce/0x170 [amdgpu]
[ 489.885815] amdgpu_device_fini_hw+0x2ff/0x413 [amdgpu]
[ 489.885960] ? blocking_notifier_chain_unregister+0x56/0xb0
[ 489.885962] amdgpu_driver_unload_kms+0x51/0x60 [amdgpu]
[ 489.886049] amdgpu_pci_remove+0x5a/0x140 [amdgpu]
[ 489.886132] ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x60/0x90
[ 489.886134] pci_device_remove+0x3e/0xb0
[ 489.886135] __device_release_driver+0x1ab/0x2a0
[ 489.886137] driver_detach+0xf3/0x140
[ 489.886138] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0
[ 489.886140] driver_unregister+0x31/0x60
[ 489.886141] pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
[ 489.886142] amdgpu_exit+0x15/0x451 [amdgpu] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erspan: do not use skb_mac_header() in ndo_start_xmit()
Drivers should not assume skb_mac_header(skb) == skb->data in their
ndo_start_xmit().
Use skb_network_offset() and skb_transport_offset() which
better describe what is needed in erspan_fb_xmit() and
ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit()
syzbot reported:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5083 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5083 at include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x1d9c/0x2d90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:962
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 5083 Comm: syz-executor406 Not tainted 6.3.0-rc2-syzkaller-00866-gd4671cb96fa3 #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/02/2023
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_header include/linux/skbuff.h:2873 [inline]
RIP: 0010:ip6erspan_tunnel_xmit+0x1d9c/0x2d90 net/ipv6/ip6_gre.c:962
Code: 04 02 41 01 de 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 1c 0a 00 00 45 89 b4 24 c8 00 00 00 c6 85 77 fe ff ff 01 e9 33 e7 ff ff e8 b4 27 a1 f8 <0f> 0b e9 b6 e7 ff ff e8 a8 27 a1 f8 49 8d bf f0 0c 00 00 48 b8 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003b2f830 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000ffff RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffff888021273a80 RSI: ffffffff88e1bd4c RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: ffffc90003b2f9d8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 000000000000ffff
R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b28da00
R13: 00000000000000d0 R14: ffff88807e25b6d0 R15: ffff888023408000
FS: 0000555556a61300(0000) GS:ffff8880b9800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055e5b11eb6e8 CR3: 0000000027c1b000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4900 [inline]
netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4914 [inline]
__dev_direct_xmit+0x504/0x730 net/core/dev.c:4300
dev_direct_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3088 [inline]
packet_xmit+0x20a/0x390 net/packet/af_packet.c:285
packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3075 [inline]
packet_sendmsg+0x31a0/0x5150 net/packet/af_packet.c:3107
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:724 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0xde/0x190 net/socket.c:747
__sys_sendto+0x23a/0x340 net/socket.c:2142
__do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2154 [inline]
__se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2150 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendto+0xe1/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2150
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x39/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
RIP: 0033:0x7f123aaa1039
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 b1 14 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffc15d12058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f123aaa1039
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000020000040 R09: 0000000000000014
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f123aa648c0
R13: 431bde82d7b634db R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: tcpm: fix warning when handle discover_identity message
Since both source and sink device can send discover_identity message in
PD3, kernel may dump below warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 169 at drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c:1446 tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 169 Comm: 1-0050 Not tainted 6.1.1-00038-g6a3c36cf1da2-dirty #567
Hardware name: NXP i.MX8MPlus EVK board (DT)
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
lr : tcpm_queue_vdm+0x2c/0xf0
sp : ffff80000c19bcd0
x29: ffff80000c19bcd0 x28: 0000000000000001 x27: ffff0000d11c8ab8
x26: ffff0000d11cc000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 00000000ff008081
x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 00000000ff00a081 x21: ffff80000c19bdbc
x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff0000d11c8080 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: ffff0000d716f580
x14: 0000000000000001 x13: ffff0000d716f507 x12: 0000000000000001
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000020 x9 : 00000000000ee098
x8 : 00000000ffffffff x7 : 000000000000001c x6 : ffff0000d716f580
x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
x2 : ffff80000c19bdbc x1 : 00000000ff00a081 x0 : 0000000000000004
Call trace:
tcpm_queue_vdm+0xe0/0xf0
tcpm_pd_rx_handler+0x340/0x1ab0
kthread_worker_fn+0xcc/0x18c
kthread+0x10c/0x110
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Below sequences may trigger this warning:
tcpm_send_discover_work(work)
tcpm_send_vdm(port, USB_SID_PD, CMD_DISCOVER_IDENT, NULL, 0);
tcpm_queue_vdm(port, header, data, count);
port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_READY;
vdm_state_machine_work(work);
<-- received discover_identity from partner
vdm_run_state_machine(port);
port->vdm_state = VDM_STATE_SEND_MESSAGE;
mod_vdm_delayed_work(port, x);
tcpm_pd_rx_handler(work);
tcpm_pd_data_request(port, msg);
tcpm_handle_vdm_request(port, msg->payload, cnt);
tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], &response[1], rlen - 1);
--> WARN_ON(port->vdm_state > VDM_STATE_DONE);
For this case, the state machine could still send out discover
identity message later if we skip current discover_identity message.
So we should handle the received message firstly and override the pending
discover_identity message without warning in this case. Then, a delayed
send_discover work will send discover_identity message again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Do not set DRR on pipe Commit
[WHY]
Writing to DRR registers such as OTG_V_TOTAL_MIN on the same frame as a
pipe commit can cause underflow. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Perform lockless command completion in abort path
While adding and removing the controller, the following call trace was
observed:
WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 623596 at kernel/dma/mapping.c:532 dma_free_attrs+0x33/0x50
CPU: 3 PID: 623596 Comm: sh Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.14.0-96.el9.x86_64 #1
RIP: 0010:dma_free_attrs+0x33/0x50
Call Trace:
qla2x00_async_sns_sp_done+0x107/0x1b0 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_abort_srb+0x8e/0x250 [qla2xxx]
? ql_dbg+0x70/0x100 [qla2xxx]
__qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x108/0x190 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_abort_all_cmds+0x24/0x70 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_abort_isp_cleanup+0x305/0x3e0 [qla2xxx]
qla2x00_remove_one+0x364/0x400 [qla2xxx]
pci_device_remove+0x36/0xa0
__device_release_driver+0x17a/0x230
device_release_driver+0x24/0x30
pci_stop_bus_device+0x68/0x90
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device_locked+0x16/0x30
remove_store+0x75/0x90
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x11c/0x1b0
new_sync_write+0x11f/0x1b0
vfs_write+0x1eb/0x280
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x5c/0x80
? do_user_addr_fault+0x1d8/0x680
? do_syscall_64+0x69/0x80
? exc_page_fault+0x62/0x140
? asm_exc_page_fault+0x8/0x30
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
The command was completed in the abort path during driver unload with a
lock held, causing the warning in abort path. Hence complete the command
without any lock held. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix call trace warning and hang when removing amdgpu device
On GPUs with RAS enabled, below call trace and hang are observed when
shutting down device.
v2: use DRM device unplugged flag instead of shutdown flag as the check to
prevent memory wipe in shutdown stage.
[ +0.000000] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_vram_mgr_fini+0x18d/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554
[ +0.000001] Call Trace:
[ +0.000001] <TASK>
[ +0.000002] amdgpu_ttm_fini+0x140/0x1c0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000183] amdgpu_bo_fini+0x27/0xa0 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000184] gmc_v11_0_sw_fini+0x2b/0x40 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000163] amdgpu_device_fini_sw+0xb6/0x510 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000152] amdgpu_driver_release_kms+0x16/0x30 [amdgpu]
[ +0.000090] drm_dev_release+0x28/0x50 [drm]
[ +0.000016] devm_drm_dev_init_release+0x38/0x60 [drm]
[ +0.000011] devm_action_release+0x15/0x20
[ +0.000003] release_nodes+0x40/0xc0
[ +0.000001] devres_release_all+0x9e/0xe0
[ +0.000001] device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
[ +0.000003] device_release_driver_internal+0xff/0x160
[ +0.000001] driver_detach+0x4a/0x90
[ +0.000001] bus_remove_driver+0x6c/0xf0
[ +0.000001] driver_unregister+0x31/0x50
[ +0.000001] pci_unregister_driver+0x40/0x90
[ +0.000003] amdgpu_exit+0x15/0x120 [amdgpu] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix pointer-leak due to insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation
To mitigate Spectre v4, 2039f26f3aca ("bpf: Fix leakage due to
insufficient speculative store bypass mitigation") inserts lfence
instructions after 1) initializing a stack slot and 2) spilling a
pointer to the stack.
However, this does not cover cases where a stack slot is first
initialized with a pointer (subject to sanitization) but then
overwritten with a scalar (not subject to sanitization because
the slot was already initialized). In this case, the second write
may be subject to speculative store bypass (SSB) creating a
speculative pointer-as-scalar type confusion. This allows the
program to subsequently leak the numerical pointer value using,
for example, a branch-based cache side channel.
To fix this, also sanitize scalars if they write a stack slot
that previously contained a pointer. Assuming that pointer-spills
are only generated by LLVM on register-pressure, the performance
impact on most real-world BPF programs should be small.
The following unprivileged BPF bytecode drafts a minimal exploit
and the mitigation:
[...]
// r6 = 0 or 1 (skalar, unknown user input)
// r7 = accessible ptr for side channel
// r10 = frame pointer (fp), to be leaked
//
r9 = r10 # fp alias to encourage ssb
*(u64 *)(r9 - 8) = r10 // fp[-8] = ptr, to be leaked
// lfence added here because of pointer spill to stack.
//
// Ommitted: Dummy bpf_ringbuf_output() here to train alias predictor
// for no r9-r10 dependency.
//
*(u64 *)(r10 - 8) = r6 // fp[-8] = scalar, overwrites ptr
// 2039f26f3aca: no lfence added because stack slot was not STACK_INVALID,
// store may be subject to SSB
//
// fix: also add an lfence when the slot contained a ptr
//
r8 = *(u64 *)(r9 - 8)
// r8 = architecturally a scalar, speculatively a ptr
//
// leak ptr using branch-based cache side channel:
r8 &= 1 // choose bit to leak
if r8 == 0 goto SLOW // no mispredict
// architecturally dead code if input r6 is 0,
// only executes speculatively iff ptr bit is 1
r8 = *(u64 *)(r7 + 0) # encode bit in cache (0: slow, 1: fast)
SLOW:
[...]
After running this, the program can time the access to *(r7 + 0) to
determine whether the chosen pointer bit was 0 or 1. Repeat this 64
times to recover the whole address on amd64.
In summary, sanitization can only be skipped if one scalar is
overwritten with another scalar. Scalar-confusion due to speculative
store bypass can not lead to invalid accesses because the pointer
bounds deducted during verification are enforced using branchless
logic. See 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on
pointer arithmetic") for details.
Do not make the mitigation depend on !env->allow_{uninit_stack,ptr_leaks}
because speculative leaks are likely unexpected if these were enabled.
For example, leaking the address to a protected log file may be acceptable
while disabling the mitigation might unintentionally leak the address
into the cached-state of a map that is accessible to unprivileged
processes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thermal: core: call put_device() only after device_register() fails
put_device() shouldn't be called before a prior call to
device_register(). __thermal_cooling_device_register() doesn't follow
that properly and needs fixing. Also
thermal_cooling_device_destroy_sysfs() is getting called unnecessarily
on few error paths.
Fix all this by placing the calls at the right place.
Based on initial work done by Caleb Connolly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bnxt: Do not read past the end of test names
Test names were being concatenated based on a offset beyond the end of
the first name, which tripped the buffer overflow detection logic:
detected buffer overflow in strnlen
[...]
Call Trace:
bnxt_ethtool_init.cold+0x18/0x18
Refactor struct hwrm_selftest_qlist_output to use an actual array,
and adjust the concatenation to use snprintf() rather than a series of
strncat() calls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Make sure trace_printk() can output as soon as it can be used
Currently trace_printk() can be used as soon as early_trace_init() is
called from start_kernel(). But if a crash happens, and
"ftrace_dump_on_oops" is set on the kernel command line, all you get will
be:
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 347519us : Unknown type 6
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 353141us : Unknown type 6
[ 0.456075] <idle>-0 0dN.2. 358684us : Unknown type 6
This is because the trace_printk() event (type 6) hasn't been registered
yet. That gets done via an early_initcall(), which may be early, but not
early enough.
Instead of registering the trace_printk() event (and other ftrace events,
which are not trace events) via an early_initcall(), have them registered at
the same time that trace_printk() can be used. This way, if there is a
crash before early_initcall(), then the trace_printk()s will actually be
useful. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv4: prevent potential spectre v1 gadget in ip_metrics_convert()
if (!type)
continue;
if (type > RTAX_MAX)
return -EINVAL;
...
metrics[type - 1] = val;
@type being used as an array index, we need to prevent
cpu speculation or risk leaking kernel memory content. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip task with pid=1 in send_signal_common()
The following kernel panic can be triggered when a task with pid=1 attaches
a prog that attempts to send killing signal to itself, also see [1] for more
details:
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
CPU: 3 PID: 1 Comm: systemd Not tainted 6.1.0-09652-g59fe41b5255f #148
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x178 lib/dump_stack.c:106
panic+0x2c4/0x60f kernel/panic.c:275
do_exit.cold+0x63/0xe4 kernel/exit.c:789
do_group_exit+0xd4/0x2a0 kernel/exit.c:950
get_signal+0x2460/0x2600 kernel/signal.c:2858
arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x78/0x5d0 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:306
exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:168 [inline]
exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x15f/0x250 kernel/entry/common.c:203
__syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1d/0x50 kernel/entry/common.c:296
do_syscall_64+0x44/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
So skip task with pid=1 in bpf_send_signal_common() to avoid the panic.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20221222043507.33037-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fscache: Use wait_on_bit() to wait for the freeing of relinquished volume
The freeing of relinquished volume will wake up the pending volume
acquisition by using wake_up_bit(), however it is mismatched with
wait_var_event() used in fscache_wait_on_volume_collision() and it will
never wake up the waiter in the wait-queue because these two functions
operate on different wait-queues.
According to the implementation in fscache_wait_on_volume_collision(),
if the wake-up of pending acquisition is delayed longer than 20 seconds
(e.g., due to the delay of on-demand fd closing), the first
wait_var_event_timeout() will timeout and the following wait_var_event()
will hang forever as shown below:
FS-Cache: Potential volume collision new=00000024 old=00000022
......
INFO: task mount:1148 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
Not tainted 6.1.0-rc6+ #1
task:mount state:D stack:0 pid:1148 ppid:1
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x2f6/0xb80
schedule+0x67/0xe0
fscache_wait_on_volume_collision.cold+0x80/0x82
__fscache_acquire_volume+0x40d/0x4e0
erofs_fscache_register_volume+0x51/0xe0 [erofs]
erofs_fscache_register_fs+0x19c/0x240 [erofs]
erofs_fc_fill_super+0x746/0xaf0 [erofs]
vfs_get_super+0x7d/0x100
get_tree_nodev+0x16/0x20
erofs_fc_get_tree+0x20/0x30 [erofs]
vfs_get_tree+0x24/0xb0
path_mount+0x2fa/0xa90
do_mount+0x7c/0xa0
__x64_sys_mount+0x8b/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x30/0x60
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
Considering that wake_up_bit() is more selective, so fix it by using
wait_on_bit() instead of wait_var_event() to wait for the freeing of
relinquished volume. In addition because waitqueue_active() is used in
wake_up_bit() and clear_bit() doesn't imply any memory barrier, use
clear_and_wake_up_bit() to add the missing memory barrier between
cursor->flags and waitqueue_active(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cgroup/cpuset: Fix wrong check in update_parent_subparts_cpumask()
It was found that the check to see if a partition could use up all
the cpus from the parent cpuset in update_parent_subparts_cpumask()
was incorrect. As a result, it is possible to leave parent with no
effective cpu left even if there are tasks in the parent cpuset. This
can lead to system panic as reported in [1].
Fix this probem by updating the check to fail the enabling the partition
if parent's effective_cpus is a subset of the child's cpus_allowed.
Also record the error code when an error happens in update_prstate()
and add a test case where parent partition and child have the same cpu
list and parent has task. Enabling partition in the child will fail in
this case.
[1] https://www.spinics.net/lists/cgroups/msg36254.html |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Skip invalid kfunc call in backtrack_insn
The verifier skips invalid kfunc call in check_kfunc_call(), which
would be captured in fixup_kfunc_call() if such insn is not eliminated
by dead code elimination. However, this can lead to the following
warning in backtrack_insn(), also see [1]:
------------[ cut here ]------------
verifier backtracking bug
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 8646 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756 backtrack_insn
kernel/bpf/verifier.c:2756
__mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3065
mark_chain_precision kernel/bpf/verifier.c:3165
adjust_reg_min_max_vals kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10715
check_alu_op kernel/bpf/verifier.c:10928
do_check kernel/bpf/verifier.c:13821 [inline]
do_check_common kernel/bpf/verifier.c:16289
[...]
So make backtracking conservative with this by returning ENOTSUPP.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/CACkBjsaXNceR8ZjkLG=dT3P=4A8SBsg0Z5h5PWLryF5=ghKq=g@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: don't skip expired elements during walk
There is an asymmetry between commit/abort and preparation phase if the
following conditions are met:
1. set is a verdict map ("1.2.3.4 : jump foo")
2. timeouts are enabled
In this case, following sequence is problematic:
1. element E in set S refers to chain C
2. userspace requests removal of set S
3. kernel does a set walk to decrement chain->use count for all elements
from preparation phase
4. kernel does another set walk to remove elements from the commit phase
(or another walk to do a chain->use increment for all elements from
abort phase)
If E has already expired in 1), it will be ignored during list walk, so its use count
won't have been changed.
Then, when set is culled, ->destroy callback will zap the element via
nf_tables_set_elem_destroy(), but this function is only safe for
elements that have been deactivated earlier from the preparation phase:
lack of earlier deactivate removes the element but leaks the chain use
count, which results in a WARN splat when the chain gets removed later,
plus a leak of the nft_chain structure.
Update pipapo_get() not to skip expired elements, otherwise flush
command reports bogus ENOENT errors. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: qcom-adm: fix wrong sizeof config in slave_config
Fix broken slave_config function that uncorrectly compare the
peripheral_size with the size of the config pointer instead of the size
of the config struct. This cause the crci value to be ignored and cause
a kernel panic on any slave that use adm driver.
To fix this, compare to the size of the struct and NOT the size of the
pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
lib/fonts: fix undefined behavior in bit shift for get_default_font
Shifting signed 32-bit value by 31 bits is undefined, so changing
significant bit to unsigned. The UBSAN warning calltrace like below:
UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in lib/fonts/fonts.c:139:20
left shift of 1 by 31 places cannot be represented in type 'int'
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x7d/0xa5
dump_stack+0x15/0x1b
ubsan_epilogue+0xe/0x4e
__ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds+0x1e7/0x20c
get_default_font+0x1c7/0x1f0
fbcon_startup+0x347/0x3a0
do_take_over_console+0xce/0x270
do_fbcon_takeover+0xa1/0x170
do_fb_registered+0x2a8/0x340
fbcon_fb_registered+0x47/0xe0
register_framebuffer+0x294/0x4a0
__drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x43c/0x880 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_fb_helper_initial_config+0x52/0x80 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_fbdev_client_hotplug+0x156/0x1b0 [drm_kms_helper]
drm_fbdev_generic_setup+0xfc/0x290 [drm_kms_helper]
bochs_pci_probe+0x6ca/0x772 [bochs]
local_pci_probe+0x4d/0xb0
pci_device_probe+0x119/0x320
really_probe+0x181/0x550
__driver_probe_device+0xc6/0x220
driver_probe_device+0x32/0x100
__driver_attach+0x195/0x200
bus_for_each_dev+0xbb/0x120
driver_attach+0x27/0x30
bus_add_driver+0x22e/0x2f0
driver_register+0xa9/0x190
__pci_register_driver+0x90/0xa0
bochs_pci_driver_init+0x52/0x1000 [bochs]
do_one_initcall+0x76/0x430
do_init_module+0x61/0x28a
load_module+0x1f82/0x2e50
__do_sys_finit_module+0xf8/0x190
__x64_sys_finit_module+0x23/0x30
do_syscall_64+0x58/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/rtas: avoid scheduling in rtas_os_term()
It's unsafe to use rtas_busy_delay() to handle a busy status from
the ibm,os-term RTAS function in rtas_os_term():
Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at arch/powerpc/kernel/rtas.c:618
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 1, name: swapper/0
preempt_count: 2, expected: 0
CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G D 6.0.0-rc5-02182-gf8553a572277-dirty #9
Call Trace:
[c000000007b8f000] [c000000001337110] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0x110 (unreliable)
[c000000007b8f040] [c0000000002440e4] __might_resched+0x394/0x3c0
[c000000007b8f0e0] [c00000000004f680] rtas_busy_delay+0x120/0x1b0
[c000000007b8f100] [c000000000052d04] rtas_os_term+0xb8/0xf4
[c000000007b8f180] [c0000000001150fc] pseries_panic+0x50/0x68
[c000000007b8f1f0] [c000000000036354] ppc_panic_platform_handler+0x34/0x50
[c000000007b8f210] [c0000000002303c4] notifier_call_chain+0xd4/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2b0] [c0000000002306cc] atomic_notifier_call_chain+0xac/0x1c0
[c000000007b8f2f0] [c0000000001d62b8] panic+0x228/0x4d0
[c000000007b8f390] [c0000000001e573c] do_exit+0x140c/0x1420
[c000000007b8f480] [c0000000001e586c] make_task_dead+0xdc/0x200
Use rtas_busy_delay_time() instead, which signals without side effects
whether to attempt the ibm,os-term RTAS call again. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: alx: take rtnl_lock on resume
Zbynek reports that alx trips an rtnl assertion on resume:
RTNL: assertion failed at net/core/dev.c (2891)
RIP: 0010:netif_set_real_num_tx_queues+0x1ac/0x1c0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__alx_open+0x230/0x570 [alx]
alx_resume+0x54/0x80 [alx]
? pci_legacy_resume+0x80/0x80
dpm_run_callback+0x4a/0x150
device_resume+0x8b/0x190
async_resume+0x19/0x30
async_run_entry_fn+0x30/0x130
process_one_work+0x1e5/0x3b0
indeed the driver does not hold rtnl_lock during its internal close
and re-open functions during suspend/resume. Note that this is not
a huge bug as the driver implements its own locking, and does not
implement changing the number of queues, but we need to silence
the splat. |