| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| A flaw was found in GNU Emacs. This vulnerability, a memory corruption issue, occurs when Emacs processes specially crafted SVG (Scalable Vector Graphics) CSS (Cascading Style Sheets) data. A local user could exploit this by convincing a victim to open a malicious SVG file, which may lead to a denial of service (DoS) or potentially information disclosure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: Fix static_branch_dec() underflow for aql_disable.
syzbot reported static_branch_dec() underflow in aql_enable_write(). [0]
The problem is that aql_enable_write() does not serialise concurrent
write()s to the debugfs.
aql_enable_write() checks static_key_false(&aql_disable.key) and
later calls static_branch_inc() or static_branch_dec(), but the
state may change between the two calls.
aql_disable does not need to track inc/dec.
Let's use static_branch_enable() and static_branch_disable().
[0]:
val == 0
WARNING: kernel/jump_label.c:311 at __static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311, CPU#0: syz.1.3155/20288
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 20288 Comm: syz.1.3155 Tainted: G U L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [U]=USER, [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/24/2026
RIP: 0010:__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked.part.0+0x107/0x120 kernel/jump_label.c:311
Code: f2 c9 ff 5b 5d c3 cc cc cc cc e8 54 f2 c9 ff 48 89 df e8 ac f9 ff ff eb ad e8 45 f2 c9 ff 90 0f 0b 90 eb a2 e8 3a f2 c9 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb 97 48 89 df e8 5c 4b 33 00 e9 36 ff ff ff 0f 1f 80 00
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b9f7c10 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff9b3e5d40 RCX: ffffffff823c57b4
RDX: ffff8880285a0000 RSI: ffffffff823c5846 RDI: ffff8880285a0000
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000000000000a
R13: 1ffff9200173ef88 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: ffffc9000b9f7e98
FS: 00007f530dd726c0(0000) GS:ffff8881245e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000001140 CR3: 000000007cc4a000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__static_key_slow_dec_cpuslocked kernel/jump_label.c:297 [inline]
__static_key_slow_dec kernel/jump_label.c:321 [inline]
static_key_slow_dec+0x7c/0xc0 kernel/jump_label.c:336
aql_enable_write+0x2b2/0x310 net/mac80211/debugfs.c:343
short_proxy_write+0x133/0x1a0 fs/debugfs/file.c:383
vfs_write+0x2aa/0x1070 fs/read_write.c:684
ksys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:793 [inline]
__do_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:801 [inline]
__se_sys_pwrite64 fs/read_write.c:798 [inline]
__x64_sys_pwrite64+0x1eb/0x250 fs/read_write.c:798
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xc9/0xf80 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f530cf9aeb9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f530dd72028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f530d215fa0 RCX: 00007f530cf9aeb9
RDX: 0000000000000003 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000010
RBP: 00007f530d008c1f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 4200000000000005 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f530d216038 R14: 00007f530d215fa0 R15: 00007ffde89fb978
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/irdma: Harden depth calculation functions
An issue was exposed where OS can pass in U32_MAX for SQ/RQ/SRQ size.
This can cause integer overflow and truncation of SQ/RQ/SRQ depth
returning a success when it should have failed.
Harden the functions to do all depth calculations and boundary
checking in u64 sizes. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()
Yiming Qian reported :
<quote>
I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg
ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via `skb_under_panic()`
(local DoS).
The core issue is a mismatch between:
- a 16-bit length accumulator (`struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen`, type
`__u16`) and
- a pointer to the *last* provided destination-options header (`opt->dst1opt`)
when multiple `IPV6_DSTOPTS` control messages (cmsgs) are provided.
- `include/net/ipv6.h`:
- `struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen` is `__u16` (wrap possible).
(lines 291-307, especially 298)
- `net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl()`:
- Accepts repeated `IPV6_DSTOPTS` and accumulates into `opt_flen`
without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data()`:
- Uses `opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen` to compute header
sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)
- `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb()`:
- Calls `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` if `opt->opt_flen` is non-zero.
(lines 1930-1934)
- `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts()` / `ipv6_push_exthdr()`:
- Push size comes from `ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt)` (based on the
pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)
1. `opt_flen` is a 16-bit accumulator:
- `include/net/ipv6.h:298` defines `__u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */`.
2. `ip6_datagram_send_ctl()` accepts *repeated* `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs
and increments `opt_flen` each time:
- In `net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933`, for `IPV6_DSTOPTS`:
- It computes `len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);`
- It checks `CAP_NET_RAW` using `ns_capable(net->user_ns,
CAP_NET_RAW)`. (line 922)
- Then it does:
- `opt->opt_flen += len;` (line 927)
- `opt->dst1opt = hdr;` (line 928)
There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy
`IPV6_2292DSTOPTS` path which rejects duplicates at
`net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904`).
If enough large `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsgs are provided, `opt_flen` wraps
while `dst1opt` still points to a large (2048-byte)
destination-options header.
In the attached PoC (`poc.c`):
- 32 cmsgs with `hdrlen=255` => `len = (255+1)*8 = 2048`
- 1 cmsg with `hdrlen=0` => `len = 8`
- Total increment: `32*2048 + 8 = 65544`, so `(__u16)opt_flen == 8`
- The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so `dst1opt` points to a 2048-byte header.
3. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465`:
- `headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen +
opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...;`
With wrapped `opt_flen`, `headersize`/headroom decisions underestimate
what will be pushed later.
4. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from
`dst1opt` and is not limited by wrapped `opt_flen`:
- In `net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934`:
- `if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);`
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211`, `ipv6_push_frag_opts()` pushes
`dst1opt` via `ipv6_push_exthdr()`.
- In `net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184`, `ipv6_push_exthdr()` does:
- `skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
- `memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt));`
With insufficient headroom, `skb_push()` underflows and triggers
`skb_under_panic()` -> `BUG()`:
- `net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675` (`skb_push()` calls `skb_under_panic()`)
- `net/core/skbuff.c:207-214` (`skb_panic()` ends in `BUG()`)
- The `IPV6_DSTOPTS` cmsg path requires `CAP_NET_RAW` in the target
netns user namespace (`ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)`).
- Root (or any task with `CAP_NET_RAW`) can trigger this without user
namespaces.
- An unprivileged `uid=1000` user can trigger this if unprivileged
user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain
namespaced `CAP_NET_RAW` (the attached PoC does this).
- Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).
-
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: ets: fix divide by zero in the offload path
Offloading ETS requires computing each class' WRR weight: this is done by
averaging over the sums of quanta as 'q_sum' and 'q_psum'. Using unsigned
int, the same integer size as the individual DRR quanta, can overflow and
even cause division by zero, like it happened in the following splat:
Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 13 UID: 0 PID: 487 Comm: tc Tainted: G E 6.19.0-virtme #45 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:ets_offload_change+0x11f/0x290 [sch_ets]
Code: e4 45 31 ff eb 03 41 89 c7 41 89 cb 89 ce 83 f9 0f 0f 87 b7 00 00 00 45 8b 08 31 c0 45 01 cc 45 85 c9 74 09 41 6b c4 64 31 d2 <41> f7 f2 89 c2 44 29 fa 45 89 df 41 83 fb 0f 0f 87 c7 00 00 00 44
RSP: 0018:ffffd0a180d77588 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff38 RBX: ffff8d3d482ca000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffd0a180d77660
RBP: ffffd0a180d77690 R08: ffff8d3d482ca2d8 R09: 00000000fffffffe
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffffe
R13: ffff8d3d472f2000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f440b6c2740(0000) GS:ffff8d3dc9803000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000003cdd2000 CR3: 0000000007b58002 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
ets_qdisc_change+0x870/0xf40 [sch_ets]
qdisc_create+0x12b/0x540
tc_modify_qdisc+0x6d7/0xbd0
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x168/0x6b0
netlink_rcv_skb+0x5c/0x110
netlink_unicast+0x1d6/0x2b0
netlink_sendmsg+0x22e/0x470
____sys_sendmsg+0x38a/0x3c0
___sys_sendmsg+0x99/0xe0
__sys_sendmsg+0x8a/0xf0
do_syscall_64+0x111/0xf80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f440b81c77e
Code: 4d 89 d8 e8 d4 bc 00 00 4c 8b 5d f8 41 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 11 c9 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 48 8b 45 10 0f 05 <c9> c3 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 e7 e8 13 ff ff ff 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa
RSP: 002b:00007fff951e4c10 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000481820 RCX: 00007f440b81c77e
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fff951e4cd0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fff951e4c20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00007fff951f4fa8
R13: 00000000699ddede R14: 00007f440bb01000 R15: 0000000000486980
</TASK>
Modules linked in: sch_ets(E) netdevsim(E)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:ets_offload_change+0x11f/0x290 [sch_ets]
Code: e4 45 31 ff eb 03 41 89 c7 41 89 cb 89 ce 83 f9 0f 0f 87 b7 00 00 00 45 8b 08 31 c0 45 01 cc 45 85 c9 74 09 41 6b c4 64 31 d2 <41> f7 f2 89 c2 44 29 fa 45 89 df 41 83 fb 0f 0f 87 c7 00 00 00 44
RSP: 0018:ffffd0a180d77588 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 00000000ffffff38 RBX: ffff8d3d482ca000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffd0a180d77660
RBP: ffffd0a180d77690 R08: ffff8d3d482ca2d8 R09: 00000000fffffffe
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 00000000fffffffe
R13: ffff8d3d472f2000 R14: 0000000000000003 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 00007f440b6c2740(0000) GS:ffff8d3dc9803000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000000003cdd2000 CR3: 0000000007b58002 CR4: 0000000000172ef0
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Kernel Offset: 0x30000000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff)
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception ]---
Fix this using 64-bit integers for 'q_sum' and 'q_psum'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xdp: produce a warning when calculated tailroom is negative
Many ethernet drivers report xdp Rx queue frag size as being the same as
DMA write size. However, the only user of this field, namely
bpf_xdp_frags_increase_tail(), clearly expects a truesize.
Such difference leads to unspecific memory corruption issues under certain
circumstances, e.g. in ixgbevf maximum DMA write size is 3 KB, so when
running xskxceiver's XDP_ADJUST_TAIL_GROW_MULTI_BUFF, 6K packet fully uses
all DMA-writable space in 2 buffers. This would be fine, if only
rxq->frag_size was properly set to 4K, but value of 3K results in a
negative tailroom, because there is a non-zero page offset.
We are supposed to return -EINVAL and be done with it in such case, but due
to tailroom being stored as an unsigned int, it is reported to be somewhere
near UINT_MAX, resulting in a tail being grown, even if the requested
offset is too much (it is around 2K in the abovementioned test). This later
leads to all kinds of unspecific calltraces.
[ 7340.337579] xskxceiver[1440]: segfault at 1da718 ip 00007f4161aeac9d sp 00007f41615a6a00 error 6
[ 7340.338040] xskxceiver[1441]: segfault at 7f410000000b ip 00000000004042b5 sp 00007f415bffecf0 error 4
[ 7340.338179] in libc.so.6[61c9d,7f4161aaf000+160000]
[ 7340.339230] in xskxceiver[42b5,400000+69000]
[ 7340.340300] likely on CPU 6 (core 0, socket 6)
[ 7340.340302] Code: ff ff 01 e9 f4 fe ff ff 0f 1f 44 00 00 4c 39 f0 74 73 31 c0 ba 01 00 00 00 f0 0f b1 17 0f 85 ba 00 00 00 49 8b 87 88 00 00 00 <4c> 89 70 08 eb cc 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8d bd f0 fe ff ff 89 85 ec fe
[ 7340.340888] likely on CPU 3 (core 0, socket 3)
[ 7340.345088] Code: 00 00 00 ba 00 00 00 00 be 00 00 00 00 89 c7 e8 31 ca ff ff 89 45 ec 8b 45 ec 85 c0 78 07 b8 00 00 00 00 eb 46 e8 0b c8 ff ff <8b> 00 83 f8 69 74 24 e8 ff c7 ff ff 8b 00 83 f8 0b 74 18 e8 f3 c7
[ 7340.404334] Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x6d255010bdffc: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 7340.405972] CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 1439 Comm: xskxceiver Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1+ #21 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 7340.408006] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-5.fc42 04/01/2014
[ 7340.409716] RIP: 0010:lookup_swap_cgroup_id+0x44/0x80
[ 7340.410455] Code: 83 f8 1c 73 39 48 ba ff ff ff ff ff ff ff 03 48 8b 04 c5 20 55 fa bd 48 21 d1 48 89 ca 83 e1 01 48 d1 ea c1 e1 04 48 8d 04 90 <8b> 00 48 83 c4 10 d3 e8 c3 cc cc cc cc 31 c0 e9 98 b7 dd 00 48 89
[ 7340.412787] RSP: 0018:ffffcc5c04f7f6d0 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 7340.413494] RAX: 0006d255010bdffc RBX: ffff891f477895a8 RCX: 0000000000000010
[ 7340.414431] RDX: 0001c17e3fffffff RSI: 00fa070000000000 RDI: 000382fc7fffffff
[ 7340.415354] RBP: 00fa070000000000 R08: ffffcc5c04f7f8f8 R09: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0
[ 7340.416283] R10: ffff891f4c1a7000 R11: ffffcc5c04f7f9c8 R12: ffffcc5c04f7f7d0
[ 7340.417218] R13: 03ffffffffffffff R14: 00fa06fffffffe00 R15: ffff891f47789500
[ 7340.418229] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff891ffdfaa000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 7340.419489] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 7340.420286] CR2: 00007f415bfffd58 CR3: 0000000103f03002 CR4: 0000000000772ef0
[ 7340.421237] PKRU: 55555554
[ 7340.421623] Call Trace:
[ 7340.421987] <TASK>
[ 7340.422309] ? softleaf_from_pte+0x77/0xa0
[ 7340.422855] swap_pte_batch+0xa7/0x290
[ 7340.423363] zap_nonpresent_ptes.constprop.0.isra.0+0xd1/0x270
[ 7340.424102] zap_pte_range+0x281/0x580
[ 7340.424607] zap_pmd_range.isra.0+0xc9/0x240
[ 7340.425177] unmap_page_range+0x24d/0x420
[ 7340.425714] unmap_vmas+0xa1/0x180
[ 7340.426185] exit_mmap+0xe1/0x3b0
[ 7340.426644] __mmput+0x41/0x150
[ 7340.427098] exit_mm+0xb1/0x110
[ 7340.427539] do_exit+0x1b2/0x460
[ 7340.427992] do_group_exit+0x2d/0xc0
[ 7340.428477] get_signal+0x79d/0x7e0
[ 7340.428957] arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x34/0x100
[ 7340.429571] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x8e/0x4c0
[ 7340.430159] do_syscall_64+0x188/
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in PF setup_nic_devices() cleanup
In setup_nic_devices(), the initialization loop jumps to the label
setup_nic_dev_free on failure. The current cleanup loop while(i--)
skip the failing index i, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by changing the loop to iterate from the current index i
down to 0.
Also, decrement i in the devlink_alloc failure path to point to the
last successfully allocated index.
Compile tested only. Issue found using code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: liquidio: Fix off-by-one error in VF setup_nic_devices() cleanup
In setup_nic_devices(), the initialization loop jumps to the label
setup_nic_dev_free on failure. The current cleanup loop while(i--)
skip the failing index i, causing a memory leak.
Fix this by changing the loop to iterate from the current index i
down to 0.
Compile tested only. Issue found using code review. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. The PlayStation TIM loader, responsible for handling PlayStation image files, incorrectly calculates the size of the Color Look-Up Table (CLUT) due to an integer overflow. This occurs when multiplying num_colors and num_cluts, both 16-bit unsigned short integers, resulting in a value exceeding the maximum integer limit. An attacker could exploit this by providing a specially crafted image file, leading to undefined behavior and causing the GIMP plug-in to abort, effectively resulting in a denial of service. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. A signed integer overflow vulnerability exists in the `file-fli` plugin when processing FLI image files. This occurs due to an incorrect calculation during memory allocation for image buffers, where the multiplication of image width and height can exceed the maximum integer value. A remote attacker could exploit this by tricking a user into opening a specially crafted FLI file, leading to the application crashing and resulting in a denial of service. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP's PNM file format parser. When parsing a specially crafted PNM file, the pnmscanner_gettoken() function writes a null terminator one byte past the end of a stack-allocated buffer due to an off-by-one error in the loop boundary check. This could lead to memory corruption, potentially resulting in denial of service or arbitrary code execution. |
| P-Net before 1.0.3 contains an integer underflow in pf_cpm_c_data_ind(). When handling a received cyclic data frame while the consumer is in the FRUN or RUN state, the offset of the APDU status was computed as the frame length minus 4 using 16-bit arithmetic, without checking that the frame is long enough. A crafted short frame makes the offset wrap around, so the function reads outside the receive buffer. This can cause a crash (denial of service) or disclose memory content. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm-stripe: fix a possible integer overflow
There's a possible integer overflow in stripe_io_hints if we have too
large chunk size. Test if the overflow happened, and if it did, don't set
limits->io_min and limits->io_opt; |
| A flaw was found in spice-vdagent. A malicious or compromised SPICE host can trigger an integer overflow by sending a specially crafted message. This vulnerability can lead to a heap buffer overflow, causing the spice-vdagent daemon to crash and resulting in a Denial of Service (DoS) for the virtual machine. This issue requires the SPICE host to be untrusted or compromised for exploitation. |
| A flaw was found in the file-sgi plugin in GIMP. When processing an RLE-compressed SGI image, the plugin allocates memory for a row table. The image header dimensions (ysize and zsize) are read as 16-bit unsigned integers. If a crafted file sets both dimensions to their maximum value (65535), the multiplication ysize * zsize overflows the standard 32-bit int boundary before being passed to calloc. This integer overflow issue results in undefined behavior, aborting the plugin and causing a denial of service. |
| Kafka Streams derives its stream-time clock from record timestamps. PunctuationSchedule.next() computed the next punctuation time as timestamp + (intervalsMissed + 1) * interval with no overflow check. A record with a timestamp at or near Long.MAX_VALUE advances stream time to that value, so the next stream-time punctuation overflows to a negative time. PunctuationQueue then re-queues that time and loops on it indefinitely while holding a lock, stalling the StreamThread.
Impact:
A single record is enough. The affected StreamThread stops processing, and because the record stays in the topic the hang returns on restart; an application whose partitions are all affected becomes unresponsive. Only the Streams application is affected, not the brokers or the cluster. Triggering it needs write access to a source topic whose topology uses stream-time punctuation, and a broker that stores the record: brokers from Apache Kafka 4.0.0 reject such a timestamp by default (log.message.timestamp.after.max.ms, one hour), so it is reachable only on older brokers or where that bound has been relaxed.
Mitigation:
Upgrade Kafka Streams to 4.2.2, 4.3.2, or 4.4.0. As defense in depth, keep log.message.timestamp.after.max.ms bounded on source topics and restrict write access to them.
Resolution:
From Apache Kafka 4.2.2, 4.3.2, and 4.4.0: the next punctuation time is computed with overflow-checked arithmetic (clamped to Long.MAX_VALUE), and a rescheduled punctuation is re-queued only when its time moves forward. |
| A flaw was found in gnutls. An off-by-one error exists in the PKCS#12 bag element bounds check. This vulnerability allows an remote attacker to write past the internal array of a PKCS#12 bag when appending to a bag that already contains 32 elements. This memory corruption could lead to a denial of service (DoS) or potentially other unspecified impacts. |
| A flaw was found in GIMP. A remote attacker could exploit an integer overflow vulnerability in the FITS image loader by providing a specially crafted FITS file. This integer overflow leads to a zero-byte memory allocation, which is then subjected to a heap buffer overflow when processing pixel data. Successful exploitation could result in a denial of service (DoS) or potentially arbitrary code execution. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: inline: fix len overflow in ext4_prepare_inline_data
When running the following code on an ext4 filesystem with inline_data
feature enabled, it will lead to the bug below.
fd = open("file1", O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0666);
ftruncate(fd, 30);
pwrite(fd, "a", 1, (1UL << 40) + 5UL);
That happens because write_begin will succeed as when
ext4_generic_write_inline_data calls ext4_prepare_inline_data, pos + len
will be truncated, leading to ext4_prepare_inline_data parameter to be 6
instead of 0x10000000006.
Then, later when write_end is called, we hit:
BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size);
at ext4_write_inline_data.
Fix it by using a loff_t type for the len parameter in
ext4_prepare_inline_data instead of an unsigned int.
[ 44.545164] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 44.545530] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:240!
[ 44.545834] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 44.546172] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: test Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00003-g9080916f4863 #45 PREEMPT(full) 112853fcebfdb93254270a7959841d2c6aa2c8bb
[ 44.546523] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
[ 44.546523] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100
[ 44.546523] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49
[ 44.546523] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 44.546523] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006
[ 44.546523] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.546523] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000
[ 44.546523] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738
[ 44.546523] FS: 00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 44.546523] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0
[ 44.546523] PKRU: 55555554
[ 44.546523] Call Trace:
[ 44.546523] <TASK>
[ 44.546523] ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x126/0x2d0
[ 44.546523] generic_perform_write+0x17e/0x270
[ 44.546523] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0xc8/0x170
[ 44.546523] vfs_write+0x2be/0x3e0
[ 44.546523] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x6d/0xc0
[ 44.546523] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0
[ 44.546523] ? __wake_up+0x89/0xb0
[ 44.546523] ? xas_find+0x72/0x1c0
[ 44.546523] ? next_uptodate_folio+0x317/0x330
[ 44.546523] ? set_pte_range+0x1a6/0x270
[ 44.546523] ? filemap_map_pages+0x6ee/0x840
[ 44.546523] ? ext4_setattr+0x2fa/0x750
[ 44.546523] ? do_pte_missing+0x128/0xf70
[ 44.546523] ? security_inode_post_setattr+0x3e/0xd0
[ 44.546523] ? ___pte_offset_map+0x19/0x100
[ 44.546523] ? handle_mm_fault+0x721/0xa10
[ 44.546523] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x197/0x730
[ 44.546523] ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0
[ 44.546523] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e/0x60
[ 44.546523] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90
[ 44.546523] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d
[ 44.546523] RIP: 0033:0x7f42999c6687
[ 44.546523] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff
[ 44.546523] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae4a7930 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012
[ 44.546523] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4299934740 RCX: 00007f42999c6687
[ 44.546523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000055ea6149200f RDI: 0000000000000003
[ 44.546523] RBP: 00007ffeae4a79a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 44.546523] R10: 0000010000000005 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: st: Fix array overflow in st_setup()
Change the array size to follow parms size instead of a fixed value. |