| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: preserve dirty bits when collapsing PTE-mapped THPs
try_collapse_pte_mapped_thp() clears PTEs without transferring their dirty
bits to the folio. A shmem read fault can map a clean folio writable, so
a later store only dirties the PTE. Losing that dirty bit allows reclaim
to discard modified data.
The assumption that regular files are read-only is also obsolete since
commit 1b6444331bebb ("mm/khugepaged: enable clean pagecache folio collapse
for writable files"). In any case, transferring PTE dirty bits to the folio
when removing mappings (and while the folio is still mapped) is the right
thing to do.
Use get_and_clear_ptes() to collect the dirty bits and mark the folio
dirty before unmapping it. Update the comment.
This was reproduced with shmem using MADV_COLLAPSE followed by
MADV_PAGEOUT.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: adjust comment; simplify description; cover file-thp as well ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: dev: can_fill_info(): don't wake up controller if interface is down
If the interface is down, the CAN controller might be powered down and
its clocks gated. Don't call do_get_berr_counter() to read the bus error
counters if the interface is down, and adjust can_get_size() to match.
This removes one trigger for a synchronous external abort seen on
i.MX8QXP when "ip link show" is run on a flexcan interface that was
never brought up. The underlying cause is platform-specific: on i.MX8QXP
the CAN clocks are gated through the SCU LPCG and the subsystem shares
the IMX_SC_R_CAN_0 power domain, and there is a window after
pm_runtime_resume_and_get() returns where the clock has not reached the
module yet. This patch avoids the netlink query path while the interface
is down, but does not root-cause the LPCG window itself.
As a result, IFLA_CAN_BERR_COUNTER is no longer reported for down
interfaces. Userspace must treat the attribute as optional.
The issue was triggered on an i.MX8QXP board by running "ip link show"
without ever bringing the interface up:
Internal error: synchronous external abort: 0000000096000210
pc : flexcan_read_le+0x0/0x18
lr : flexcan_get_berr_counter+0x4c/0x8c
Call trace:
flexcan_read_le+0x0/0x18
flexcan_get_berr_counter+0x4c/0x8c
can_fill_info+0x1f8/0x434
rtnl_fill_ifinfo+0x8fc/0xbb4
rtnl_dump_ifinfo+0x364/0x448
This is the same class of problem fixed for m_can in
commit 91a55c72a821 ("can: m_can: m_can_get_berr_counter(): don't
wake up controller if interface is down"). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: protect the receive lists with a per-device lock
The receive lists of a CAN device are located in the device's
can_ml_priv and travel with the device when it is moved to another
network namespace. But they are protected by the per-netns
rcvlists_lock. So can_rx_unregister() needs dev_net(dev) to pick the
right lock and silently returns when the passed namespace does not
match dev_net(dev) anymore.
isotp_release() and bcm_release() leave their notifier list before they
take any lock that serializes against the netdev notifier, which runs
under RTNL. When the bound device is moved to another namespace in this
window, the notifier skips the socket and the release path has to remove
the filters itself. isotp_release() passes the socket's namespace, which
does not match dev_net(dev) anymore. bcm_rx_unreg() passes dev_net(dev),
which can_rx_unregister() reads again for its check, so a namespace
change between both reads makes the check fail as well. In both cases
can_rx_unregister() silently returns. As can_rx_register() stores
rcv->sk without a reference, the remaining receivers point to the freed
socket (isotp) or the freed op (bcm):
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in isotp_rcv+0x1570/0x24d0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888118130552 by task isotp_ns_uaf/578
can_rcv_filter+0x4af/0x8c0
can_receive+0x28d/0x3c0
can_rcv+0x2a9/0x310
__netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x21a/0x260
process_backlog+0x210/0x760
Besides this, the lists of a device are protected by the rcvlists_lock
of the namespace that is passed in. Callers which pass dev_net(dev) read
it at different times, so the same lists may be modified under the locks
of different namespaces while the device is moved.
Taking RTNL in these release paths is no option: raw_bind(),
raw_setsockopt() and raw_release() already hold RTNL while adding and
removing up to CAN_RAW_FILTER_MAX filters per socket, which unprivileged
users can trigger repeatedly and which makes RTNL a global bottleneck.
Instead fix the root cause and add a spinlock to struct
can_dev_rcv_lists, which protects the receive lists of a CAN device or
the 'any' CAN device lists of a namespace. It is initialized in
can_set_ml_priv(), which is used by all CAN network devices. With this,
can_rx_unregister() finds the subscription independently of the
current namespace of the device. The protocols keep the device valid
with their tracked references. The per-netns rcvlists_lock only protects
the receive list statistics anymore, and CAN_RAW, CAN_BCM and CAN_ISOTP
pass the namespace that has been used for can_rx_register().
So isotp_release() and bcm_release() now remove their filters correctly
without RTNL, and raw_release(), raw_setsockopt(), raw_bind() and
isotp_bind() do not need RTNL anymore and add and remove their filters
under lock_sock(). To serialize bind() with NETDEV_UNREGISTER, bind()
publishes the device inside the RCU section of its lookup, and
raw_notify() and isotp_notify() recheck the bound device under lock_sock().
As RTNL does not keep NETDEV_DOWN out of bind() anymore, bind() checks
IFF_UP after publishing the bound device, with a barrier pair against
raw_notify() and isotp_notify(), so a down transition during bind() is
still reported with ENETDOWN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwrng: virtio - prevent use-after-free after a failed restore
remove_common() frees the driver data during freeze, but does not clear
vdev->priv, which points to freed memory. If probe_common() then fails
during restore, a later remove or freeze can dereference the dangling
pointer.
Clear vdev->priv on the probe_common() error cleanup path and before
freeing the driver data in remove_common(). Also reset the device and
return early from remove_common() if vdev->priv is already NULL for a
safe teardown after a failed restore. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/virtio: Reset device before deleting virtqueues on probe failure
viommu_probe() marks the device DRIVER_OK before populating the event
virtqueue and registering the IOMMU device in sysfs. viommu_fill_evtq()
hands the device a set of device-writable buffers through
virtqueue_add_inbuf(), so from that point on the device may write into
them and into the rings.
If either step fails, the error path deletes the virtqueues without
resetting the device first. The event buffers are allocated with
devm_kmalloc_array() and are released as probe unwinds, so the device can
go on writing to memory that has been freed.
Reset the device before deleting the virtqueues, the way viommu_remove()
already does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vhost: fix used ring index wrap in vhost_add_used_n_in_order
vhost_add_used_n_in_order() advances start by nheads[i] but wraps it
with a single subtraction. If start + nheads[i] >= 2 * vq->num, start
can remain outside the ring.
With used-ring logging enabled, start > vq->num makes (vq->num - start)
underflow. log_write() then sets bits beyond the dirty-log bitmap,
potentially corrupting adjacent userspace memory. This is reachable on
the vhost-net TX path with VIRTIO_F_IN_ORDER: done_idx can reach
VHOST_NET_BATCH (64), triggering the issue with a 32-entry ring.
Wrap start with a mask to keep it within the ring. VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM
enforces a nonzero power-of-two ring size, allowing start to be wrapped
using & (vq->num - 1). |
| Uninitialized resource in Media in Google Chrome prior to 158.0.8127.36 allowed a remote attacker to read memory inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| A vulnerability was detected in itsourcecode Banking Management System 1.0. This impacts an unknown function of the file manage_donation.php of the component Donor Management. The manipulation of the argument ID results in sql injection. The attack may be performed from remote. The exploit is now public and may be used. |
| In Splunk Enterprise Security versions below 8.7.0, a user that holds a role with the run_collect capability could store attacker-controlled values in vulnerability data. If another user who can access the Vulnerability Search dashboard selects an affected row, Splunk Enterprise Security could run attacker-controlled Search Processing Language (SPL) commands using the permissions of the user who selects the row. The user who stores the values could then access sensitive data and modify some data available to the user who selects the row.
The vulnerability is possible because the Vulnerability Search dashboard encodes data-model field values for the drilldown link but does not escape the values as SPL search literals before inserting the values into drilldown searches.
For more information see Define roles on the Splunk platform with capabilities (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.4/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/define-roles-on-the-splunk-platform-with-capabilities) and Network dashboards (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise-security-8/user-guide/8.7/analytics/network-dashboards) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a Splunk SOAR user who can edit and run playbooks for a permitted container label could associate action and callback state with a running playbook outside that container label. This could affect playbook automation for containers that the user cannot view.
The vulnerability is possible because the Playbook Automation API accepts a supplied playbook run identifier without verifying that it is bound to the server-provided playbook execution context.
The vulnerability requires a running playbook on a container label that the user cannot view. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user who can edit and run playbooks on a container label could associate a custom-function callback with another playbook run. The callback could modify the state of a container outside the authorized scope for that user.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not bind playbook API requests to the trusted playbook run and container context. |
| In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user with permission to create and run playbooks could start child playbooks on containers outside the authorized label, or repository scope for that user. This could expose container data and affect automation outside that scope.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not bind the identity used to authorize the child playbook run to the parent playbook execution context. |
| In Splunk App for Stream versions below 8.1.7, an unauthenticated user who can reach the Splunk App for Stream Representational State Transfer (REST) API on the management port (8089) could upload an Extensible Markup Language (XML) vocabulary file, which lets the vocabulary upload endpoint read local files accessible to the Splunk process or send outbound requests.
The vulnerability is possible because the vocabulary upload endpoint parses uploaded XML without an application-level policy that blocks external entity resolution.
For more information see About Splunk Stream (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/collect-stream-data/install-and-configure-splunk-stream/8.1/introduction/about-splunk-stream) and restmap.conf (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/admin-manual/9.4/configuration-file-reference/9.4.3-configuration-file-reference/restmap.conf) in the Splunk documentation. |
| OpenRemote is an open-source internet-of-things platform. Prior to 1.31.0, an authenticated user who obtains another user's MQTT session ID can disconnect that session across realm boundaries through the GET route GET {realm}/disconnect/{sessionID}. In manager/src/main/java/org/openremote/manager/security/UserResourceImpl.java, disconnectUserSession ignores the requested realm and calls mqttBrokerService.disconnectSession(sessionID) without checking session ownership; model/src/main/java/org/openremote/model/security/UserResource.java exposes the route without an @RolesAllowed restriction. The earlier cross-realm read-method guards did not cover this disconnect method, and same-realm users can also disconnect sessions they do not own. Session IDs are not trivially brute-forceable but may be exposed through monitoring, logs, or correlated API calls, and the unauthorized disconnect can disrupt MQTT connectivity across tenant boundaries without directly disclosing session data. This issue is fixed in 1.31.0. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.6.1, 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, an unauthenticated user could determine whether a username exists through the Representational State Transfer (REST) API or Splunk Web and lock out existing user accounts through repeated login attempts.
The vulnerability is possible because Splunk Enterprise returns different login failure responses for locked existing user accounts and nonexistent usernames. |
| In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.4, 10.2.8, 10.0.11, and 9.4.17, a user that holds a role with the edit_own_objects capability but does not hold the edit_view_html capability could create or modify a private Hypertext Markup Language (HTML) view through the Representational State Transfer (REST) API.
The vulnerability is possible because the REST API applies the edit_own_objects capability when it creates or modifies private HTML-based views instead of requiring the edit_view_html capability.
For more information see Define roles on the Splunk platform with capabilities (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.2/manage-splunk-platform-users-and-roles/define-roles-on-the-splunk-platform-with-capabilities) in the Splunk documentation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_qfq: prevent aggregate self-replacement
qfq_change_class() snapshots the current aggregate settings while
holding the qdisc tree lock, but drops the lock before selecting the
destination aggregate. During that gap, qfq_enqueue() can move the
class to an aggregate matching the requested settings.
When qfq_change_class() resumes, qfq_find_agg() then returns cl->agg.
If it is a singleton, qfq_deact_rm_from_agg() frees the aggregate
before qfq_add_to_agg() immediately accesses the same pointer, causing
a use-after-free.
While holding the tree lock, skip the replacement when the destination
is already the current aggregate. Any estimator replacement has already
completed, so the class change can finish normally. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix temporary cursor leak in btree shift corruption paths
In xfs_btree_lshift and xfs_btree_rshift, when XFS_IS_CORRUPT detects
an invalid firstrec/lastrec result after xfs_btree_dup_cursor has
successfully allocated a temporary cursor, the error path jumps to
error0 which returns without freeing tcur. This leaks the cursor
memory, the xfs_group reference, and the per-level buffer references
held by the duplicated cursor. Jump to error1 instead, which calls
xfs_btree_del_cursor(tcur, XFS_BTREE_ERROR) to properly release all
resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources
A socket container's node and socket must remain alive while the
container is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node
and sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but
sc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the
container.
With CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last
socket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached
the connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that
workqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node
removal can proceed without waiting for the sender's final sc_put():
Sender (final sc_put) Configfs rmdir Debugfs reader
-------------------- -------------- --------------
o2nm_undepend_item()
Drop node item refs
o2nm_node_put()
[node can be freed]
sc_seq_show()
Lock debug lock
Read sc_node->nd_name
Unlock debug lock
sc_node = NULL
o2net_debug_del_sc()
The earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is
still selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has
not yet been cleared:
Sender (final sc_put) Debugfs reader
-------------------- --------------
sock_release(sc->sc_sock)
[socket can be freed]
sc_seq_show()
Lock debug lock
Read sc_sock->sk fields
Unlock debug lock
sc_sock = NULL
...
o2net_debug_del_sc()
Move o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking
under the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish
and prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers
both socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats
formatter.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
string+0x42b/0x470
vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110
seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260
sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0
seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110
seq_read+0x362/0x5a0
full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180
vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20
ksys_read+0x111/0x200
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
(User register dump omitted.)
</TASK>
Allocated by task 497:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610
o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0
configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0
vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0
filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450
__x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0
do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Freed by task 505:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
__kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80
kfree+0x308/0x580
config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230
config_item_put+0x79/0x90
sc_put+0x454/0x6e0
o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560
o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0
validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0
full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180
vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010
ksys_write+
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: stop recovery before shutting down local allocators
Recovery completion needs the local allocators until it has finished
reclaiming a failed node's allocation window and truncate log. During
unmount, quota recovery is stopped first, but that leaves recovery_state
at OCFS2_REC_QUOTA_DISABLED. New non-quota recovery can still start.
ocfs2_truncate_log_shutdown() drains existing completion work and releases
osb_tl_bh before ocfs2_recovery_exit() closes that publication path:
Unmount Recovery
------- --------
stop quota recovery; disable quotas
truncate_log_shutdown()
flush existing completion work
recover another failed node
queue completion
flush local log; release buffer
complete_truncate_log_recovery()
use released osb_tl_bh
recovery_exit(): disable and drain
An extra buffer reference alone would still let completion append new
records after the final truncate-log flush.
Split stopping and draining recovery from freeing its state. Stop all
recovery producers and drain completion work before shutting down either
local allocator. Keep recovery-state release at its existing later point,
so its lifetime relative to other teardown users stays unchanged. The
second stop at recovery_exit() is harmless once recovery is disabled.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881093711e8 by task kworker/u16:3/53
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
Workqueue: ocfs2_wq ocfs2_complete_recovery
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0
print_report+0xce/0x630
? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420
? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360
kasan_report+0xe0/0x110
? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360
ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360
? __pfx_ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10
ocfs2_complete_truncate_log_recovery+0x315/0x780
? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160
? __pfx_ocfs2_complete_truncate_log_recovery+0x10/0x10
? ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x666/0x11b0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? kfree+0x308/0x580
ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x676/0x11b0
? __pfx_ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x10/0x10
? reacquire_held_locks+0xdd/0x200
? process_one_work+0x7c8/0x1b40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10
? process_one_work+0x834/0x1b40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? lock_release+0xc8/0x290
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
process_one_work+0x9a8/0x1b40
? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300
? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __kthread_parkme+0x177/0x220
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x351/0x460
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940
? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf70
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Allocated by task 538:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan
---truncated--- |